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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview.
"Eminent domain" refers to the power of the state to "take"
private property. Least known of the taxing-police-taking trium-
virate of governmental powers, eminent domain is said to be sub-
ject to only two requirements: that the taking be compensated
and that it be for a public use. Both appear to be relatively recent
developments, the compensation requirement emerging in Anglo-
American jurisprudence in the late seventeenth century and the
public use limitation coming largely after American independence
from Britain.
Most litigation and much debate has centered on the com-
pensation requirement: what constitutes fair payment to an often
unwilling seller? But perhaps the more interesting issue is what
constitutes a public use? Or more precisely, for what purposes
can the state expropriate private property? Although the public
use limitation seems largely a judicial invention, it is one that
both reflects the prevalent ideology of private property and medi-
ates the political challenges that might arise should the state's
ability to take property ever appear entirely unfettered.
The uses of eminent domain unfolded as the economy un-
folded. Up through the eighteenth century eminent domain was
employed primarily to build roads and to provide hydropower for
grist mills widely used by local populations. In the latter case,
owners of mill sites were allowed to build dams and take, upon
paying compensation, the upstream lands flooded as a conse-
quence. Upstream owners were limited to specified damages and
precluded from enjoining the dams, a right they would have had
under traditional nuisance law. The takings were justified in large
part by the "public uses" made of them by local community
members.
In the early nineteenth century the mill acts were put to use
for new industries like paper mills and foundries. Since the actual
"use by the public" held to justify the grist mill takings was no
longer present and had been replaced by a distinct aura of eco-
nomic favoritism, the public use doctrine became a major source
of contention. It remained an important issue in the 1840s, when
the railroads began to roll over the nation's expanses, their pro-
gress greatly eased by legislative grants of eminent domain. A few
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decades thereafter public utilities began to string their webs of
communication and energy conduits across the countryside, also
taking land at will. About the same time many of the western
states, hungry for development, began to offer eminent domain
power to virtually any enterprise promising to bring them capital.
In this century eminent domain has been prominently employed
and powerfully fought in various urban redevelopment projects.
At every historical juncture the courts have had to decide
whether to enforce takings with substantial new private develop-
ment components. Their decisions form an interesting chapter in
American political-economic history.
B. Objectives.
The history and results of public use challenges are interest-
ing not merely for their philosophical implications, but also for
what they tell us about the changing relationship between state
and economy. The chronicle of the public use limitation provides
a useful perspective on which constituencies' interests have been
served by government intervention and which have not. By effec-
tively changing the structure of property rights, as will be seen,
eminent domain can be used to distribute and redistribute mate-
rial benefits.
Eminent domain policy remains politically important today.
At present proposals are pending in various legislatures to grant
condemnation power to a number of projects for accelerated re-
source exploitation. Congress for instance is considering whether
to grant federal eminent domain to builders of coal slurry pipe-
lines.1 While particular applications of the power change, the un-
derlying issues show some continuity.
What follows is the first product of an ongoing inquiry into
the uses and consequences of eminent domain in the United
States. Section II is a history of the public use requirement. It
examines not only how the doctrine has been articulated and logi-
cally extended, but particularly what purposes have been accom-
plished under it. Section III is an analytic critique of the public
use doctrine. After considering whether. any principled standard
can be developed to delimit the proper uses of eminent domain, it
1. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, COAL SLURRY PIPELINES: PROGRESS AND
PROBLEMS FOR NEW ONES (April 20, 1979).
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examines a number of the complicated empirical and political
questions confronted in any effort to develop such a standard. 2
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTOURS
Two preliminary provisos: First, the analysis here is largely
confined to development of the case law. Since all significant uses
of eminent domain need not have reached appellate decision, the
case law may be an incomplete or misleading indicator of the ac-
tual deployment and effects of eminent domain. Second, a pre-
mise of this article is that the most revealing dimension of emi-
nent domain law is its interaction with the interests of privately
held capital. Takings to facilitate traditional governmental func-
tions (e.g., to build schools), though sometimes problematic, s are
not so telling as those more directly facilitating private capital
growth. Developments on both ends of the public-private contin-
uum are noted, but the latter are emphasized.
A. The Mists of History
The roots and development of eminent domain appear fully
as obscure as those of the taxing and police powers. In his cele-
brated opinion in Gardner v. Village of Newburgh,4 Chancellor
Kent stated at least four justifications for ordering that down-
stream riparian owner be compensated for water taken by a vil-
lage waterworks project-none of them being the state constitu-
tion, which at that time had no compensation requirement. First,
he suggested that the failure to provide compensation to this type
of property owner while compensating others was a legislative
oversight.' Second, he cited the civil law writers, Grotius, Puf-
2. Ongoing work involves extensive empirical research into the actual social
consequences of different eminent domain policies. Therefore, much of what fol-
lows necessarily remains tentative. While social implications can often be inferred
from judicial and legislative decisions, past socio-legal studies have indicated that
such inferences are frequently either incorrect or seriously incomplete in light of
the complex social arrangements in which legislative and judicial decisions oper-
ate. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 195-209 infra.
3. Should a governmental unit be allowed, for instance, to exercise eminent
domain when there is no geographic monopoly and where other satisfactory sites
are available on the market? Isses of this kind are discussed infra.
4. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
5. The statute provided compensation to the owner of the spring and to own-
ers of land across which conduits would be laid. Id. at 164.
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fendorf, and Bynkershoek, for the proposition that compensation
is required "by all temperate and civilized governments, from a
deep and universal sense of its justice." Third, he cited
Blackstone:
The sense and practice of the English government are equally ex-
plicit on this point. Private property cannot be violated in any
case, or by any set of men, or for any public purpose, without the
interposition of the Legislature. And how does that Legislature in-
terpose and compel? "Not," says Blackstone, "by absolutely strip-
ping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner, but by
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury
thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual
treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the Legisla-
ture does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a
reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power which the
Legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the Leg-
islature can perform. 7
Finally, the Chancellor noted the presence of compensation re-
quirements in several other state constitutions,8 and invoked the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution,' the applica-
bility of which to the states was at that time subject to great
doubt.
On the compensation requirement, and on the general source
of the eminent domain power, 10 other jurists have done little bet-
ter. Indeed they frequently cite Chancellor Kent's opinion as a
key authority. Practical, historical, and philosophical assertions
are often intermingled in justifying the basic power. Thus some
courts have long relied on notions for natural law,1 some on con-
cepts of basic sovereignty,"8 and others on notions of reserved
6. Id. at 166.
7. Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
8. Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Ohio, id.
9. Id. at 167-68.
10. It might be noted that the compensation requirement and the eminent
domain power are counterposed and seem to derive from different grounds, the
former from the rights of individuals, the latter from the rights of government.
11. E.g., Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816); Sin-
nickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129 (1839); Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 (1847). See
generally Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain,
6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1931).
12. The argument is that the power to condemn is inherent in the exercise of
sovereignty. It is necessary to the existence of government, and all governments,
1980]
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rights 8 and historical legitimacy."' Since these theories are pri-
marily efforts to legitimate an accomplished state of affairs, and
since this article is essentially an effort to comprehend the devel-
opment of that state of affairs, it is more useful to examine the
historical evidence than to debate the theories.
1. Rome and the civil law jurisdictions
Legal scholars have unearthed little direct evidence on the
use of eminent domain in ancient times. They wonder, practically
by circular implication, possess it. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367
(1876); San Mateo County v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 P. 78 (1900); Northeastern
Gas Trans. Co. v. Collins, 138 Conn. 582, 87 A.2d 139 (1952); Water Works Co. v.
Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364 (1872); Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y.
1831); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. MacGruder, 63 Ohio St. 455, 59 N.E.
216 (1900); White v. Nashville & Nw.R.R., 54 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 518 (1872); Stearns
v. Barre, 73 Vt. 281, 50 A. 1086 (1901). Since Kohl, the inherent attribute of sover-
eignty notion has been invoked routinely by courts in all jurisdictions.
13. The reserved rights notion seems to trace to the civil law writer Grotius,
who hypostatized that all land had been held by the sovereign prior to private
possession and that private possession was subject to an implied reservation that
the sovereign could retake possession. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.13 (rev.
3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1 NICHOLS]. A variety of state decisions have
recited this theory, e.g., Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S.W.
792 (1887); Todd v. Austin, 34 Conn. 78 (1867); Board of Health v. Van Hoesen,
87 Mich. 533, 49 N.W. 894 (1891). The idea is also embodied in some state consti-
tutions, e.g., N.Y. CoNST. art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Various criticisms
may be noted. First, this theory of origin does not necessarily imply a compensa-
tion requirement. Second, in the United States there are generally two sovereign-
ties, both having eminent domain power over the same property. It is difficult to
argue that both have some concurrent prior ownership interests, particularly as
regards the colonial states. For a more extensive discussion, see 1 NICHOLS, supra,
at § 1.13[3].
14. A variety of cases, including Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch.
162 (N.Y. 1816), suggest eminent domain derives from common law practices. 1
NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.13[2] cites 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §§
408, 409 (1897) for the argument that eminent domain is a natural outgrowth of
feudal tenure. An important case on the use of eminent domain for urban develop-
ment, New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936),
makes the same assertion. See text accompanying note 123 infra. Some courts,
finally, have used an implied consent theory analogous to classical conceptions of
social contract. Members of society, it is suggested, in coming together to organize
governments, have impliedly consented that their property rights will yield to the
needs of government. See, e.g., Embury v. Connor, 3 Conn. 511 (1830); Thatcher v.
Dartmouth Bridge Co., 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 501 (1836); Livingston v. Mayor of
New York, 11 Wend. 300 (N.Y. 1831); Secombe v. Railroad Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)
108 (1874). Available historical evidence is discussed in more detail infra.
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in unison, whether the straight roads and aqueducts of ancient
Rome might indicate some eminent domain-like power. Conclu-
sions differ. Stoebuck seems to assume that the Romans em-
ployed some sort of eminent domain' while the reviser of Nichols
doubts that they did. 6 The difference appears to be as much one
of definition as of historical evidence, however.
Defined most broadly-as the state-compelled transfer of
property-there can be little doubt that eminent domain was ex-
ercised by the Romans. Not only is it "impossible to believe that
the construction of the Roman roads, extending in a straight line
from one end of the Empire to the other, or of the Roman aque-
ducts, was at the mercy of the owners of land through which they
were to pass,"1 7 but there is evidence of provisions allowing ap-
propriation, with compensation, of materials to repair aque-
ducts.18 Moreover, the Romans carried out a number of land re-
distributions. Certain of them involved citizens holding full title
and provided for some level of compensation (often only for
buildings and improvements). 19
Notably lacking in the Roman evidence are two features now
thought central to eminent domain: established rights of the in-
jured party to compensation and a legal proceeding to determine
the validity and extent of the taking.20 To equate the absence of
these guarantees with the absence of eminent domain generally
would be to treat legal forms as self-contained and to ignore their
historical evolution. On the contrary, the most interesting aspects
of eminent domain for purposes of this inquiry are the different
accommodations between private and governmental prerogatives
over property in different eras and societies.
In Rome it seems (as it may seem about our times to future
scholars) that the public-private accommodation was somewhat
fluid and ambiguous. The strong emphasis on inviolable private
15. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. Rav. 553,
554 (1972).
16. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.211].
17. Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REv. 512, 521 (1929). See
also Pound, The Valuation of Property in Roman Law, 34 HARV. L. REv. 227, 252
(1921), noting provisions for restitution or compensation in cases where property
had been confiscated.
18. Jones, supra note 17, at 523.
19. Id. at 515-517.
20. Id.
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property that prompts some to doubt the existence of eminent
domain"' was counterposed against an equally impressive and
purposive state. Jones suggests that the prospects of aggrieved
property owners may have varied substantially according to their
political positions and the nature of the taking. 2 Nonetheless,
there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that the Romans took
privately held property to further a variety of public purposes.' s
The mode and terms of taking probably varied with particular
situations and the accommodations reflected the relative powers
of the parties and local exigencies. A more durable, standardized
compromise would await other times and societies.
The demise of Rome, entailing as it did the relative demise of
the nation-state, yielded an era of still more fluid, variable prop-
erty rights. Under medieval fuedal systems most property rights
became more directly tied-and subject-to patriarchal relations.
With the reascendency of nation-states the legal structuring of
eminent domain resumed. Though no systematic study of emi-
nent domain in the civil law countries appears available in En-
glish (if at all), seventeenth century civil law writers, including
Grotius,"' Puffendorf,25 Bynkershoek," and others, gave the issue
a lively enough concern to ensure its inclusion in the civil codes.27
By that time however, English law had developed its own direc-
tions.
2. England
The roots of eminent domain in England are deeply buried
and tangled. Despite the eventual emergence of a strong concep-
tion of private property, there appears to have been no unified,
complementary doctrine of "takings" in the early English law.
21. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.2[1].
22. Jones, supra note 17, at 523-24.
23. Id.
24. H. GROTIus, DE JuRE BELLI ET PACis 385 (1625)(F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
25. S. PUFFENDORF, DE JuRE NATRUAE ET GENTIUM 1285 (1672) (C. & W.
Oldfather trans. 1934).
26. C. VAN. BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONEM JURIS PUBLICI LIBRI Duo 218-23
(1737) (T. Grank trans. 1930).
27. E.g., FRENCH CODE CIVILE art. 545 ("No one can be compelled to give up
his property, except for the public good, and for a "just and previous indem-
nity."); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF BELGIUM art. II; FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HOLLAND
art. 147.
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Nichols notes several practices (e.g., "surveyance and preemp-
tion," "inquest of office") resembling eminent domain takings.28
Nevertheless the assertion that the "power of eminent domain
was thus well established in England by the time of the American
Revolution, and the obligation to make compensation had become
a necessary incident to the exercise of the power"20 indulges a
general tendency to find a close continuity in the development of
English and American law which appears inappropriate in this in-
stance. The primary problem is that takings which now would be
categorized as exercises of eminent domain fell in prerevolution-
ary England into a variety of categories and derived from a vari-
ety of acts with differing justifications. Stoebuck, whose scholar-
ship on the English law seems more thorough than that of
Nichols, notes:
[Als far as is known, no Englishman or American prior to the
Revolution worked out a systematic speculative theory of eminent
domain .... The English to this day have not raised the subject of
eminent domain to the imperative level at which it now exists in
America. They do not even use the phrase "eminent domain," but
instead, "compulsory acquisition," "compulsory powers," or "ex-
propriation." Compensation may be said to be a constitutional
principle, to the extent such can exist without a constitution. Mod-
ern English treatises on expropriation scarcely go back of the
Lands Clauses Act of 1845, which was the first permanent, general
statute on the subject. Before that, the power to take and the duty
to pay compensation were spelled out in each act that directed the
particular project for which the taking would occur.30
At least well into the eighteenth century then, and probably a
good deal later, the English law of takings consisted of a variety
of loosely related arrangements-generally reflecting the relative
powers of the king, the parliament, and the land owners when the
arrangements were made.
Stoebuck distinguishes the king's prerogatives from parlia-
ment's. The king's included dominion of the sea, control over
navigation, defense of the realm, providing for his household, and
many others, most of them deriving from periods before parlia-
ment's ascendancy. 1 The royal prerogatives in turn carried im-
28. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.2[11.
29. Id. § 1.21[5].
30. Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 554.
31. Id. at 562.
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plied powers for implementation, frequently impinging on private
property rights.8 2 Most, according to Stoebuck, were done without
compensation. 3
In distinguishing the king's prerogative from parliament's,
Stoebuck asserts that whatever else the king might do, he could
never take a possessory estate in land. He might acquire interests
such as profits and easements, but not estates.3 4 Stoebuck sug-
gests this limitation-assuming its historical accuracy-might
have been sustained on the theory that the king, as ultimate lord
and grantor, could not derogate from his own grant.
Presumably the effectuation of this theory could be traced to
the growing political and economic power of the landed classes,
but Stoebuck chooses to pursue a more philosophical tack. He ar-
gues that the king's inability to take possessory estates funda-
mentally distinguished his prerogatives from eminent domain:
only parliament could truly exercise eminent domain (i.e., author-
ize the taking of possessory estates).3 5 This distinction seems sus-
piciously compatible with the Lockean notions of social contract
and representative consent which Stoebuck soon brings into the
discussion. He finds not only that there is a philosophical basis
for distinguishing the taking powers of the king from those of
parliament-the taking of possessory estates is a far more serious
matter and should be allowed only upon the consent of one's
elected representatives-but that the English practice actually
corresponds to this principle. Such a neat fit between political
theory and social practice always raises the question whether the
practice has been accurately described. Moreover, Stoebuck's ap-
proach largely ignores the political process by which the parlia-
32. Id. at 563:
Under some of these powers, the king or his ministers might make use of
private land and to some extent even destroy the substance of it, all with-
out compensation. For instance, the king might, it was finally decided in
1606, dig in private land for saltpeter to make gunpowder for defense of the
realm. Or he might, through his commissioners of sewers, rebuild and repair
ancient drains, ditches, and streams for draining the land to the sea. This
came from his power to guard against the sea and to regulate navigation.
From the same power, he might build and repair lighthouses, build dikes,
and grant port franchises. . . . Fortifications could be built without com-
pensation on private land, these being, of course, for defense of the realm.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id.
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ment gradually gained political power and perhaps came to con-
strain the king from takings he could earlier have accomplished
through sheer coercion.
Nonetheless, the parliamentary history probably reflected the
primary considerations-philosophical and political-that would
eventually play a large role in forming the American practice.
Stoebuck's search for the first parliamentary act authorizing a
compulsory taking of a possessory estate is illuminating, even if it
is not accepted as the categorical standard for the first exercise of
eminent domain. His concise, original findings are best conveyed
by quotation:
The first definite evidence of expropriation of land and, therefore,
of eminent domain, is found in the earliest of the several statutes
of sewers, enacted in 1427.* Reciting that ancient ditches, gutters,
walls, bridges, and causeways for draining lowlands in Lincoln
County had fallen into disrepair, the statute appointed commis-
sioners of sewers to maintain them, with power to assess benefitted
landowners. Evidence of power to take land is fleeting: "where shall
need of new to make." There is no indication of condemnation pro-
cedure, nor of a compensation requirement. Coke, however, says
the taking of land for new works was authorized under this act and
under the several renewals of it.** A most interesting statute of
* Stat. 6 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1427). The earliest statute found that even remotely
contains elements of eminent domain was the Statute of Winchester of 1285,
which required landowners to cut down underbrush along roads so that robbers
might not hide. Stat. Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 2, c. 5 (1285). Obviously this
was not an exercise of eminent domain but of what we would call the police power,
as were some other statutes of the Middle Ages that required riparian owners to
remove such obstructions as "gorces, mills, wears, stanks, stakes and kiddles"
from navigable streams. Stat. of Cloths, 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 4, c. 4 (1350). See also
Stat. 1 Hen. 5, c. 2 (1413); Stat. 4 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1425); Stat. 9 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1430).
To their contemporaries, the Statute of Winchester and the navigable-stream tak-
ing acts would likely have been understood as passed in aid of the King's preroga-
tive powers.
Another practice that falls short of eminent domain is the old English system,
also very much a part of American history, of requiring landowners to contribute
labor and materials to the repair of roads. See, e.g., Stat. for Mending of Roads, 2
& 3 Phil. & M., c. 8 (1555); Stat. 5 Eliz., c. 13 (1562); Stat. 18 Eliz., c. 10 (1576);
Stat. 29 Eliz., c. 5 & 2 (1587); Stat. 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 12, §§ 5, 6, 7 (1691); Stat. 1
Geo. 1, Stat. 2, c. 52 (1715); Stat. 7 Geo. 2, c. 9 (1734).
** Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610). The origi-
nal statute was for ten years. It was continued from time to time by Stat. 18 Hen.
6, c. 10 (1439); Stat. 23 Hen. 6, c. 8 (1444-45); Stat. 12 Edw. 4, c. 6 (1472); Stat. 4
Hen. 7, c. 1 (1488-89); and Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1514-15).
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1512 definitely allowed land on the Cornish coast to be taken, or at
least occupied, for fortifications and, in express language, without
compensation.# Why without compensation? Obviously because
the act was in aid of the king's prerogative to build fortifications,
as the statutes of sewers were in aid of his prerogative to drain land
into the sea. Perhaps it is significant also that it was thought neces-
sary explicitly to deny compensation, hinting that someone in 1512
might otherwise have expected it. At all events, by 1514 and again
in 1539 we have clear examples of eminent domain with compensa-
tion in a form we would recognize today. The 1514 statute author-
ized the city of Canterbury to improve a river, but provided that
anyone whose mill, bridge, or dam was removed should be "reason-
ably satisfied."## In 1539 the statute granted power to the mayor
and bailiffs of Exeter to clear the River Exe providing that "they
shall pay to the owners and farmers of so much ground as they
shall dig, the rate of twenty years purchase, or so much as shall be
adjudged by the justices of assise in the county of Devon.t It is
interesting to note that the cities of Canterbury and Exeter were
authorized by Parliament to perform works the king might have
done under his prerogative powers. Not only does this indicate the
king's power was not exclusive, but it suggests that, while the king
might have acted without paying compensation, Parliament would
not. After this period of time, Parliament exercised its power of
eminent domain regularly and often. .... 6
That some of the king's and parliament's powers appear to have
been concurrent may also cut against Stoebuck's nice distinction
to some degree, but the gradual emergence-and tenuousness-of
eminent domain doctrine shows through. The basic direction of
the doctrine was set. Increasingly, both the king's and parlia-
ment's takings of property were judicially mediated and compen-
sated."7 One standard, however, the public use requirement, never
has been imposed in England. a8 In America it was to become a
linchpin-perhaps double hinged-in the relation between state
and economy.
#Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1512).
##Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514-15).
t Stat. 31 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1539).
36. Id. at 565-66.
37. Stoebuck notes that all of the king's prerogative powers except one (the
power to destroy property to halt a conflagration) now probably have been com-
prehended within expropriation doctrines requiring compensation. Id.
38. 1 NicHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.2[5].
[Vol. 11:1
PUBLIC USES OF EMINENT DOMAIN
B. America
European settlement of America graciously occurred late
enough to leave a better record of its history and legal arrange-
ments. Eminent domain emerged quite early in the process.
1. The Colonies
Not surprisingly, the development of eminent domain doc-
trine followed the development of the land. The first recorded
uses of eminent domain were for building roads.3 9 In Massachu-
setts a statute of 1639 authorized county courts, upon a complaint
stating that a highway was needed, to appoint local citizens to lay
one out. 0 Destroying houses, gardens, or orchards was prohibited.
Compensation, with appeal to the county court, was to redress
damage to other "improved ground." Stoebuck documents similar
schemes for Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, and North
Carolina.4'
Early takings in some other colonies were not so consistent
with the current mode. New York, for instance, was a Dutch col-
ony subject to civil law provisions allowing the taking of private
lands for public ways without compensation. Even under the
Dutch, however, there is evidence to suggest that compensation
was occasionally paid."2 By 1691, after the British had been in
control for some time, rights to damages and court hearing appear
to have become fairly general.
The proprietary colonial governments of New Jersey and
39. In Great Britain eminent domain evidently had not been much used,
partly, it may be presumed, because the Romans established many of the rights of
way during their conquest and partly because many of the other roads were ini-
tially established as tollroads and later given or sold to the government due to the
difficulties of maintenance.
40. 1 LAWS OF COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH (1639); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at
§ 1.2212]. By 1693 the statute had been revised to require a court-appointed com-
mittee of freeholders to determine whether the way was required for public neces-
sity and convenience. Mass. L. 1693, ch. 10, found in ACTS AND LAWS OF His MAJ-
ESTY'S PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY I NEW-ENGLAND 47-49 (B. Green
printer 1726) (as cited in Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 580).
41. Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 581.
42. Nichols notes a 1656 provision requiring burgomasters to give notice to
property holders who might be damaged by streets and, if agreement could not be
reached, to refer damages to two or three disinterested appraisers. 1 NICHOLS,
supra note 13, at § 1.22[3].
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Pennsylvania both reserved rights to take back for highway pur-
poses six percent of all the lands they granted. As a result emi-
nent domain problems were not initially as prominent in those
colonies. Nonetheless, the courts evidently provided some resis-
tance when improved property was involved, and both govern-
ments gave damages for specified types of improvements. 48
The history in several other colonies is not clear. Practices in
early Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia are not really known.44
For quite some time the less urban colonies in the South took
land for highways without compensating owners.45 Overall, roads
may have been viewed more as grants than as takings in those
more rural environs. In any case, compensation requirements
were slow in coming. South Carolina in particular continued to
take land and materials for highways without compensation until
well after independence-about 1836.46
Though public road building was the primary and probably
the most doctrinally influential use of eminent domain during the
colonial period, other uses should be noted. First, eminent do-
main was also used in most colonies to take land for private
rights-of-way. Authorizations varied, but generally appear to have
allowed land-locked owners to condemn rights-of-way, at their
own expense, across neighboring lands to gain access to public
highways.47 Some of the new roads, according to Nichols, were
open to the public and others were not.48
Second, there existed a variety of "mill dam acts" allowing
43. Id. §§ 1.2214]-[5]. Stoebuck argues that the rationale for generally deny-
ing compensation in New Jersey was that the owners' benefits exceeded their
losses. After 1765 the practice of paying for highways evidently became more com-
mon in New Jersey. Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 581-82.
44. See Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 581-82.
45. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.22[6].
46. State v. Dawson, 3 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 100 (1836) (Richardson, J., dissenting),
offers a frequently cited discussion of this practice.
47. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.22[7] and 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT Do-
MAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1979) § 7.626. Nichols does not document thoroughly that pri-
vate way provisions existed in "most, if not all, of the colonies," but does note
statutes enacted in Plymouth Colony in 1671. 1 LAws OF COLONY OF NEW PLYM-
OUTH 278 as cited in 2A NICHOLS § 7.626; in New York in 1772, Taylor v. Porter, 4
Hill 773 (N.Y. 1843); and in Pennsylvania in 1735, Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5
Am. Rep. 450 (1871).
48. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.22[7].
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downstream riparian owners to dam streams and condemn the
flooded property of upstream owners, rather than negotiate for
the rights or be subject to traditional nuisance remedies. While
the origins and contents of these provisions are obscure and sub-
ject to some scholarly disagreement,"0 they appear to have been
relatively common in prerevolutionary times. Nichols attributes
them to seven colonies: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.50 Vir-
ginia's mill dam act was apparently the earliest, dating from
1667. 1' The New England colonies evidently limited use of the
statutes to parties already owning land on both sides of the
stream .while the southern colonies allowed those owning mill
sites on one side to condemn an acre on the other side for dam
abutments.5 2 In all cases, of course, damages were paid by the
condemning party, though as will be seen below, payments did
not always reflect the full value of the property rights in question.
By the end of the colonial period then, eminent domain as a
legal form had begun to take shape. Though far from universal,
compensation was a reasonably well-established principle.5 1 Some
49. Compare Horwitz, The Transformation of the Conception of Property in
American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 248, 270-79 (1973) with 1 NICHOLS,
supra note 13, at § 1.2218] and Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978).
50. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.2218], citing the opinion of Justice Gray
in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
51. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.22[8]. Horwitz, supra note 49, at 270,
labeled the Massachusetts Act, dating from 1713, the oldest. It seems reasonable
to presume that the reviser of NICHOLS found materials of which Horwitz was
unaware.
52. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 13, at § 1.2218]. A further difference between the
New England and Southern practices is reflected in present procedures. The Mas-
sachusetts Acts did not require mill owners to institute proceedings to validate the
flooding. Rather, any party damaged by the flooding was required to apply for a
court warrant ordering a jury to appraise his yearly damage. The verdict arrived
at precluded any further legal proceedings (aside from collection actions) by the
damaged party. (For an interesting analysis of this device, see Horwitz, supra note
49.) The Southern colonies, in contrast, generally required the mill owner to sue
out a writ ad quod damnum, with the damaged owners as respondents, before a
taking could be validated. A minority of states still follow the Massachusetts ap-
proach; takings can be accomplished without judicial proceedings and damages are
contingent upon the initiation of proceedings by the damaged landowner. Most
states, however, require judicial proceedings, particularly for takings by privately
held corporations.
53. Stoebuck's finding should be kept in mind, however. "As far as exhaustive
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form of court redress also appears to have been regularly availa-
ble. But the question of what purposes eminent domain should be
available for-a question the English had never discussed and the
civil law writers had contested 5 4-was still in a more embryonic
form. Already eminent domain's exercise was split between gov-
ernmental bodies and private parties. That it could bypass mar-
ket processes and override traditional property rights, moreover,
made eminent domain a potent and highly desired power. Finally,
the uses to which it was already applied manifested no internal
limits of applicability. Thus it would become a much sought after
and contested prerogative in the land settlement and economic
expansion America would soon undergo. Much of the process cen-
tered on defining and applying what would come to be known as
the "public use" requirement.
2. The States
At the time of the American Revolution neither established
practice nor doctrine limited the exercise of eminent domain to
public uses. Indeed in 1776 only two state constitutions contained
the words, "public use," or the idea, and none explicitly limited
eminent domain to public uses.55 Pennsylvania's provision read:
"but no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or
applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his
legal representatives. . . ."I'l Virginia's provided "that . . . all
men . . . cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public
use, without their own consent, or that of representatives so
elected."5 " In grammatical terms at least, neither provision di-
research shows, there was not a single English, nor, for that matter, any reported
American colonial, decision rendered prior to the formation of the Union in which
it was held or said that compensation was required for a taking." Stoebuck, supra
note 15, at 575. Stoebuck may belie his own research in finding that "early state
courts were justified in their claim that compensation was a principle of the com-
mon law-of immemorable usage in our land and in the land of our land." Id. at
583.
54. See Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 588-90.
55. Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 591-92. This study appears the most thorough
historically and should be consulted for further details and references.
56. PA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. VIII (1776), found in 5 F. THORPE,
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3083 (1909), as cited in Stoebuck, supra note
15, at 591 n.129.
57. VA. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 6 (1776), found in 7 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONs 3813 (1909) as cited in Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 591
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rectly limited takings to public uses. Several states shortly there-
after adopted similarly phrased provisions, but none of the other
eleven state constitutions had expressed the concept of public use
at the time of independence.5 8
The historical evidence is not rich enough to select defini-
tively among alternative possible interpretations of language like
that of the Pennsylvania and Virginia articles. Perhaps the draft-
ers had never contemplated that property might be taken for
other than public uses. Perhaps they assumed that it could be.
Perhaps the matter simply had never received much attention.
Some combination of the first and last propositions appears most
plausible. Further, it may be surmised that eminent domain had
yet to emerge distinctly from the complex of due process con-
siderations flowing from the development of Magna Charta. Both
the quoted provisions for instance, emphasize the Lockean no-
tions of representation and effective consent, rather than the sub-
stantive nature of the use.
The provision that finally emerged in the Bill of Rights in
1789 perpetuated the ambiguity. Madison's draft of what is now
the fifth amendment included double jeopardy, compulsory testi-
mony, and general due process clauses along with an eminent do-
main clause: "No person shall be . . . obliged to relinquish his
property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation."GO In ratification it was merged with several more
provisions and shortened to the current form: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."60
Whether the revision was intended simply to economize on lan-
guage or also to weaken the public use provision must be left to
the most ethereal forms of speculation. If the available evidence
demonstrates anything, it is that eminent domain was not high
among the concerns of those debating the Bill of Rights. Indeed
there is little evidence that it was a concern at all. Eminent do-
main was one prerogative the British had not been charged with
abusing in the New World. Moreover, the framers may well have
assumed that representative government would adequately pro-
tect against abuses of eminent domain, particularly so long as
n.130.
58. Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 591.
59. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5.
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compensation was assured. In any event, the public use limitation
as it emerged from the various constitutional conventions at the
end of the eighteenth century remained a very rough-hewn and
largely implicit restraint. Perhaps even more than most other
constitutional provisions, it would receive most of its shaping and
articulation in actual conflicts over takings still to be attempted.
a. Standard governmental functions
The available evidence indicates that during the first decades
after independence the primary uses of eminent domain remained
essentially what they had been during the colonial era: building
roads and mill dams. At the same time a relatively benign class of
uses was growing more common. These were takings to carry on
general governmental functions 1-for example, to build town
halls, capitols, court houses, fire stations, schools, post offices, and
so on. Though there is evidence that eminent domain was used
for these purposes from quite early times, litigated cases are
sparse enough to suggest either that such takings were relatively
infrequent or that they ordinarily were not thought unreasona-
ble. " Both answers are likely true. In the early stages of national
settlement, land usually was not scarce. Most governmental bod-
ies probably found it convenient simply to purchase property
available on the market. In addition, these takings fall readily
enough into the commonsense notion of public use to make chal-
lenges based on the public use requirement unpromising and
therefore relatively unlikely.
In any event, traditional governmental takings are not of
great interest here. Such takings, when compensated, have been
seen as legitimate from the earliest times. They fall by common
understanding within the notion of public use. Most important,
their role in the capital development and resource exploitation of
61. "Governmental function" is here used in a broad, general sense. The elu-
sive distinction between proprietary and governmental functions sometimes dis-
cussed in state and local government law should not be imputed. Here the concept
of governmental function includes some services, e.g., education, that might other-
wise be considered proprietary.
62. "That land may be taken by eminent domain to enable the United States,
a state, or a county, city, or town to carry on its governmental functions is so,
generally conceded that there are few cases in which the question has been liti-
gated." 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.5111.
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the nation has been relatively slight." They are therefore summa-
rized briefly here and considered as an analytic class in the next
section.
The most common types of governmental function takings
have been listed. For the most part they consist of takings to con-
struct governmental buildings. Takings to establish lighthouses,
public cemetaries, auditoriums, and convention centers also have
been allowed. ' Takings to carry out governmental welfare func-
tions are relatively commonplace. Thus condemnations of prop-
erty for hospitals, "almshouses," and schools (occasionally pri-
vately operated) routinely have been upheld. 5
The most controversial class of governmental takings proba-
bly reflects the general tenor in property law against allowing gov-
ernments too much latitude to enforce "esthetic" purposes. It in-
cludes condemnations to establish parks, to preserve historic
properties, and to prevent degradation of designated landscapes
(scenic easements). This family of takings has been the latest to
develop and doctrine in the area still appears somewhat unset-
tled. It has two branches, neither of which will be dealt with ex-
tensively here. The first involves cases where the governmental
body purports to be exercising the police power by regulating the
use of property, but is alleged in fact to be effecting a taking.
Historic preservation ordinances provide the best example. The
legal question is ordinarily whether the restriction sufficiently de-
creases the value of the property to amount to a taking requiring
compensation. 6 The practical object often is simply to nullify the
63. An exception is acknowledged for such general welfare functions as educa-
tion and medical services. But these are much more related to tax and expendi-
ture policies than to eminent domain, which has been relatively incidental to their
implementation.
64. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at §§ 7.515, 7.5181.
65. Id. §§ 7.515, 7.517.
66. The most frequently cited doctrinal standard was set out by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), one of the few
Supreme Court cases invalidating a police power regulation as a taking. The case
may no longer be good law, but its general formulation remains common: to make
it "commercially impracticable" to exploit a property interest "has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at
414. Compare one of the most interesting contemporary cases in the area, Penn
Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), where a landmark-preser-
vation ordinance applied to bar construction of an office building atop Grand Cen-
tral Terminal, and thus severely diminishing earning ability, was held not to be a
19801
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
restrictions, the presumption being that the governmental unit
would be unwilling to compensate all similarly situated property
owners and therefore would not enforce the restraint. The public
purpose limitation has rarely come into play in these cases, since
practically all of them assume that the purpose validly could be
accomplished under the eminent domain power. This assumption
was given notable substance as early as 1896, when the Supreme
Court upheld a federal statute providing for the taking, restora-
tion, and preservation of the Gettysburg Battlefield.67
The second type of "esthetics" case involves attempts to use
eminent domain directly for esthetic purposes. Whether the
power could validly be exercised to create parks was doubted
from the time of Bynkershoek e' down to Shoemaker v. United
States in 1893. Shoemaker emphatically allowed the taking of
land for a park. Half a century earlier Justice Putnam had, in
dictum to a case considered in more detail below, confidently as-
serted that: "Property is nevertheless sufficiently guarded by the
Constitution. The individual is protected in its enjoyment, saving
only when the public want it, not merely for some ornamental,
but for some necessary and useful purposes. '7' That uses for
which property might be expropriated should be more meritori-
ous or materially pressing than parks and other niceties had been
a widely held sentiment. Yet there evidently was no developed
doctrine, nor even sharply defined rationale, to support this atti-
tude. As applied to the physical establishment of parks, the no-
taking, in part because other beneficial uses were still available.
67. United States v. Gettysburg Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). See generally 2A
NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.519111.
68. Since the subject then is bound to part with his property for both reasons,
as I said, must he also lose it for purposes of public pleasure or aesthetic
gratification or even public decoration alone? I should not think so, nor did
the Roman senate think so in the case of Marcus Licinius Crassus, who
objected to leading through his farm an aqueduct which the praetors were
building and which was said to have no other occasion than public pleasure
and decoration.
C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 26, at 15.
69. Justice Shiras observed: "In the memory of men now living, a proposition
to take private property without the consent of its owner, for a public park, and to
assess a proportionate part of the cost upon real estate benefited thereby, would
have been regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power." Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
70. Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. 467, 481 (12 Pick. 68,
70) (1832).
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tion took a crippling blow from Shoemaker. But it has enjoyed a
longer existence in the more ethereal realm of incorporeal
hereditaments.
The most extensive litigation of incorporeal condemnations
has been over takings of "scenic easements. '71 Scenic easements
are rights to "use" the scenic beauty of a given parcel of prop-
erty-i.e., to prevent the owner from destroying that beauty. The
easements typically forbid the erection of billboards, creation of
dumps, or removal of trees and shrubs, and permit only agricul-
tural or residential uses.
The argument that scenic easements do not satisfy the public
use requirement follows the somewhat elliptical logic that the
public does not acquire any affirmative privileges to "use" the
property in a physical sense and that since scenic easements may
be seen as merely a set of compensated land use restrictions, they
are not legitimate exercises of eminent domain. Though a number
of states apparently have not yet adjudicated the exact question,
the likelihood that the public use requirement will be found satis-
fied is high. This seems so first because the state courts have be-
come ever more permissive of property restrictions for esthetic
purposes imposed via the police power.7 2 Stricter standards for
compensated property restraints would be difficult to rationalize.
But more important, the overall development of the public use
requirement has been in a direction that would make it virtually
71. Most of the scenic easements litigation arose from a provision of the
Highway Beautification Act of 1965 setting aside three percent of all apportioned
funds for roadside development and scenic preservation around federal-aid high-
ways. Pub. L. No. 89-285, tit. III, § 301(a), 79 Stat. 1032 (1965) (amending 23
U.S.C. § 319 (1976)).
72. The cases are collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1234-41 (1968).
There also exists a strong, though not invincible, notion that as long as a given
goal legitimately may be pursued by government, it matters little which power is
used to do so. Though suggested by a number of early cases, it was most directly
expressed in the influential case of New York Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y.
333, 340, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1936) (discussed infra):
The fundamental purpose of government is to protect the health, safety
and general welfare of the public. . . .Its power plant for the purpose con-
sists of the power of taxation, the police power, and the power of eminent
domain. . . . [I]t seems to be constitutionally immaterial whether one or
another of the sovereign powers is employed.
The Supreme Court effectively accepted this view in Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
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anomolous if esthetic uses were not included. In Berman v.
Parker, an urban redevelopment case discussed below, the Su-
preme Court emphasized the broad scope of considerations, in-
cluding esthetic ones, which legislatures could find to be public
uses.7 8 More recently, several influential state supreme court cases
have held scenic easement takings to be valid exercises of emi-
nent domain . 7 In the widely discussed Kamrowski decision, the
Wisconsin Supreme court noted that "[t]he learned trial judge
succinctly answered plaintiff's claim that occupancy by the public
is essential in order to have a public use by saying that in the
instant case, the occupancy is visual. 7 5 Thus semantic formula-
tions for handling the problem are available, and given the gen-
eral direction of land use doctrine there can be little doubt that
takings of scenic easements generally will be sustained.
What is perhaps most intriguing about this recent contro-
versy, however, is that esthetic takings have been seen as the
most marginal, the most vulnerable type. Takings for more mate-
rial or utilitarian purposes often have not received as much de-
bate. They fall into several general categories. First are takings by
governmental bodies to facilitate governmentally provided eco-
nomic support functions. These include such "infrastructure"
components as highways, airports, and waste disposal systems.
Next are takings by "public service corporations," such as rail-
roads and power companies. Public service corporations suppos-
edly earn their eminent domain privileges by being obligated to
provide necessary services without discrimination and at reasona-
ble rates. Finally, there are takings by ordinary private enter-
prises for which a special set of justifications ostensibly must
operate.
While these categories provide a useful framework for consid-
ering state-economy developments, it must be noted at the outset
that the actual deployment of eminent domain follows no simple
progression from one to the next. Nor, as will be seen more
clearly in the next section, is the type of organization exercising
73. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
74. Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966); Department
of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Keller, 61.111. 2d 320, 335 N.E.2d 434 (1975); Hardesty
v. State Rds. Comm'n, 276 Md. 25, 343 A.2d 884 (1975); Wes Outdoors Advertis-
ing Co. v. Goldberg, 55 N.J. 347, 262 A.2d 199 (1970).
75. Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 264, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797 (1966).
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eminent domain necessarily a critical factor to the validity or de-
sirability of a taking. The purposes served, and the forces at
work, often are independent of the label placed on the organiza-
tion doing the taking.
To outline as simply as possible the development of the case
law, the following discussion is organized chronologically for the
most part."' Two themes, the progression of actual uses and the
evolution of public use doctrine, interweave with and highlight
one another throughout.
b. Capital development and resource exploitation
As the Colonial period gave way to the national period the
primary uses of eminent domain were establishing roads and
flooding lands to provide water power. Both were of course closely
linked to economic development. Roads were essential to opening
up the ever-expanding interior and exploiting its resources. Ready
water power was equally critical to the development and imple-
mentation of new industrial technologies. Building of public roads
would continue to the- present, with certain surges and special
forms to be noted below, but without any substantial opposition
on the public use question. Private roads and mill dams gave rise
to a more complicated history.
The seven prerevolutionary mill acts had expanded to
twenty-nine by 1884, when the only known compilation was
done.7 The uses to which they were put had expanded commen-
surately. The era of the grist mill used by local farmers gave way
in the first half of the nineteenth century to one of saw mills,
cotton mills, pulp mills, and foundries, and legislatures generally
were quite willing to extend mill act prerogatives to the new in-
dustries. That the uses were growing increasingly private was not
addressed in the courts until after the process was well underway.
The first significant public use challenge to the new devolutions
indicates how far the new uses already had proceeded. In an 1832
76. This chronological organization is all the more appropriate if one com-
mentator's depiction of the case as "massive .. , irreconcilable in its consistency,
confusing in its detail, and defiant of all attempts at classification" is accepted.
Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem, 58 YALe. L.J. 599, 605-606 (1949).
77. The mill acts are compiled in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 19
(1885).
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case several condemnees challenged the New Jersey legislature's
authorization of a private corporation to take land for seventy
mill sites along a six-mile stretch of the Delaware River.78 The
court rejected their argument that the act took private property
for private use and private profit, noting the changing "situation
and wants of the community" and intimating that the statute
should be upheld because the community generally benefited
from it. The Massachusetts high court upheld a similar statute
soon afterward79 and a variety of states followed the lead thus
established.80 By 1870 similar acts had been upheld in Connecti-
cut, New Hampshire, Maine, Tennessee, Indiana, and Wiscon-
sin,81 all primarily on the theory that a taking which contributed
to the overall benefit of the community met the public use test.
The lack of limits on the types of takings such a general pub-
lic benefit test could justify, and its inconsistency with the ideol-
ogy of inviolable private property, gave rise to a concurrent
countermovement in public use doctrine. Following the lead of
New York, a number of courts struck down private eminent do-
main authorizations, gradually articulating the view that public
use meant literally use by the public."8 Thus two separate posi-
tions, the "broad" public benefit view and the "narrow" use-by-
the-public view, began to grow up beside each other, but the prac-
tical consequences appear rather minor. Only in New York, Geor-
gia, and Alabama was there any consistent rejection of mill dam
delegations for general manufacturing.68 Many courts, while for-
mally embracing the use-by-the-public view, developed elaborate
methods of evading its implications. Perhaps most artful was the
Massachusetts court, which had for some time been at the fore-
front in allowing eminent domain to private users on very
favorable terms.8 ' In order to sustain the water power preroga-
78. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832).
79. Boston & Roxbury Mill Dam Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. 467 (12 Pick. 68)
(1832).
80. See the cases cited in 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.623.
81. See also, Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Alloca-
tion by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 240
(1973).
82. Tracy concurring in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9,
56-62 (N.Y. 1837); Sadler v. Langhorn, 34 Ala. 311, 333 (1859). See generally cases
cited in 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.623.
83. Id. See also Scheiber, supra note 81.
84. For a thorough discussion, see Horwitz, supra note 49, at 270-78. Horwitz
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tives which had become integral to Massachusetts's rapidly grow-
ing manufacturing sector while still subscribing to the use-by-the-
public view, Chief Justice Shaw held that the mill acts were not
eminent domain exercises at all, but rather police power exercises
requiring "compulsory joint development of property." The
ability of industries to get water power fared no worse in most
other jurisdictions and it is doubtful that the use-by-the-public
doctrine operated to any significant degree to inhibit industrial
growth through water power.
Deriving from the same period is another class of controver-
sial takings, the so-called landlocked-owner statutes allowing con-
demnations by private individuals to build essentially private
roads. Though arguably violating the strict public use standard
and regularly challenged up to comparatively recent times, land-
locked-owner takings generally have been upheld. A variety of
justifications have been advanced, none of them strictly consis-
tent with a use-by-the-public standard. Perhaps the most persua-
sive for the country's early history was that since the country con-
sisted largely of wilderness and since the government could not
hope to furnish all the roads needed, "the use of condemnation to
open private roads . . .was a necessity if the country was to be
developed at all."' The courts rationalized upholding such tak-
draws much of his analysis from developments in Massachusetts, and documents a
variety of instances in which the courts were willing to cut back the rights of up-
stream owners in order to facilitate development.
85. Initially in Fish v. Farmingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. 451 (12 Pick. 36)
(1832); most strongly stated in Murdock v. Stickney, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 113, 116
(1851). See also Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 548, 553:
It is not a right to take and use the land of the proprietor above, against his
will, but it is an authority to use his own land and water privilege to his
own advantage and for the benefit of the community. It is a provision...
for regulating the rights of proprietors . . . in a manner best calculated on
the whole, to promote and secure their common rights in [the stream].
The United States Supreme Court, through a former Massachusetts judge, Justice
Gray, accepted this view for a while. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 19
(1885). This was despite the fact that the state court in the case had viewed the
statute as an exercise of eminent domain and upheld it under the broad public
benefit test. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 56 N.H. 386 (1876). See also Nichols,
The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615,
621 (1940). (This Nichols, it should be noted, was not the author of Nichols on
Eminent Domain, cited at notes 13 & 47, supra.)
86. Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
203, 207 (1978).
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ings against public use challenges in a variety of ways. Some
found that though the condemning owner would pay for the
road's maintenance, it was in practice open to the public to reach
the condemnor's property and therefore satisfied the use-by-the-
public test.87 Others applied a broader public benefit test and
found it easily satisfied."6 A third group, however, mostly apply-
ing a use-by-the-public standard, struck down the private road-
building statutes.89 A number of states responded by amending
their constitutions to define necessary private road takings as
public uses.90
While takings for small private roads were regularly chal-
lenged, and caused the courts some consternation, much more
substantial delegations of eminent domain to private interests
were accomplished and exercised without causing significant
strains on the case law, for they could pass both the narrow and
broad tests. The first recipients were turnpike and canal compa-
nies. Among the seminal projects were the Lancaster Turnpike,
completed in 1794, and the Erie Canal, completed in 1825. They
were complemented by numerous similar projects in the first sev-
eral decades of the eighteenth century. 1 Then, as the railroads
87. See cases cited in 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.626.
88. Id. One case, Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37, 41-42 (1850), is especially in-
teresting in that the Georgia courts had been among the stronger resisters of mill
act delegations. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
89. Id. The Washington court actually construed a state constitutional provi-
sion providing for compensated takings of private ways to apply only where there
was an implied grant arising out of a conveyance. In such a common law ease-
ment-by-necessity case, of course, compensation would have been unncessary.
Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 P. 681 (1903).
90. Id.
91. It is interesting to note that though New York had taken perhaps the
strictest position in hewing out the use-by-the-public standard, it was very liberal
in allowing the delegation of eminent domain and a variety of other expediting
prerogatives, some discussed below, to the Erie Canal project. The canal project
could of course meet either the public use or the public benefit standards and
raise other meritorious justifications as well. Without doubt it contributed enor-
mously to the initial settlement of the interior. Many of the issues were discussed
in an interesting opinion by Chancellor Kent in Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735
(N.Y. 1823), upholding a taking for the project. See generally in this area E. KIR-
KLAND, MEN, CITIES AND TRANSPORTATION: A STUDY IN NEW ENGLAND HISTORY,
1820-1900 (1948); R. SHAW, ERIE WATER WEST: A HISTORY OF THE ERIE CANAL,
1792-1854 (1966); H. SCHEMER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT
AND THE ECONOMY, 1820-1861 (1969). Schieber, supra note 81, at 237, states that
"[dievolution of eminent domain power upon turnpike, bridge, canal, and railroad
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took over supremacy in building the transport sector they also
took over the exercise of eminent domain-and put it to more
extensive use than ever before." Road building, a stagnating en-
terprise, receded to the towns and counties, and few substantial
new roads were established during the era. Many canal companies
languished or went bankrupt." The railroads meanwhile system-
atically began to span the country and even push back its fron-
tiers. From the most embryonic beginnings in 1830, almost 3000
miles of track had been established by 1840 and 30,000 miles by
1860. As the industry really hit its stride in the next several de-
cades, so did its use of eminent domain.
Some of the artful devices created to assist developers during
the mill dam era were carried to new levels of sophistication for
the railroads. The legislatures and courts also showed fresh inge-
nuity in ensuring the rapid expansion of the railroad system. Not
only were condemnees frequently limited by state statute to de-
fined damages and methods of valuation, as they had been under
the mill acts, but the courts showed a marked solicitude for the
peculiar problems facing the railroads. After declaring them pub-
lic service corporations bound to provide their services at reason-
able rates to all comers without discrimination, the courts gra-
ciously shielded them from most nuisance, trespass, and damage
suits as they would have shielded state officials.9" They tended to
limit takings findings to cases of physical invasion and often re-
fused to grant damages for significant incursions on the produc-
tivity of property. Finally, the courts applied applied an "offset-
ting damages" doctrine, allowing railroads to offset the value of
the land directly taken by the increase in value of the con-
companies was done in every state."
92. Every jurisdiction in which it was challenged upheld the use of eminent
domain by railroads. For citations to the multitude of cases, see 2A NICHOLS,
supra note 47, at § 7.521.
93. About half the canals in the United States were abandoned during the
ensuing railroad era. See E. KIRKLAND, supra note 91.
94. For more detailed documentation of these rulings, see Scheiber, supra
note 81; KIRKLAND, supra note 91; Horwitz, supra note 49; Scheiber, The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts,
5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (1971); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
95. Id. See, e.g., Penn. R.R. v. Merchant, 119 Pa. 541 (1888); see generally 1
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 37-38 (2d ed. 1953) [here-
inafter cited as VALUATION).
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demnee's remaining property. A number of states tended to pre-
sume offsets, allowing railroads to take property at virtually no
cost."
Thus by the 1870s the ostensible tightening of the public use
requirement had been counterbalanced by an unprecedented ex-
tension of eminent domain to privately held corporations. In most
cases, the delegations could be upheld under either the strict or
the narrow standard. Turnpikes, railroads, bridges, and canals
were all arguably used by the general public. Mill dam takings
created more complicated problems, but they were for the most
part upheld. Now that broad transportation and substantial in-
dustrial sectors had been developed, the country was entering a
period of accelerated industrial development that would also
prove to be unprecedented. In its turn, this period of develop-
ment would create some new problems in the deployment of emi-
nent domain.
First, following directly on the growth of railroads, and in
part driven by that growth, came a major expansion in mining.
Though there is no evidence of.mining companies using eminent
domain to obtain their mining claims, they were virtually always
able to condemn property for access and transport facilities.9
Private-road statutes were of course as readily available to mining
companies as to other private interests, but the court found the
justifications so much more persuasive-under general "affected
with a public interest" notions-as to immunize them from some
forms of common liability, especially in states with major mining
industries. In a well-known Pennsylvania case, for instance, a coal
mining company was shielded from liability for runoff pollution
of downstream water supplies."
96. See generally the articles by Scheiber, cited at notes 81 & 94, supra.
97. Id. Note also, for instance, that the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916,
ch. 9, § 9, 39 Stat. 864 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976)), reserved all coal
and minerals to the federal government, as well as rightR to enter, prospect, and
mine. Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976), and
the Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 22
(1976)), the government made rights to prospect for and to mine the reserved
minerals rather easy to obtain. The holder of the surface estate had a right to
compensation for damage to improved land, but no right to prohibit prospecting
or mining. Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 864 (current ver-
sion at 43 U.S.C. § 799 (1976)).
98. "The necessities of a great public industry, which although in the hands
of a private corporation, serves a great public interest" justified such "trifling in-
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The surge in eastern and midwestern industrial growth after
the 1860s and the stunning railroad proliferation of the period
(about 70,000 miles of track were laid in the 1880s alone) created
a major drive to exploit western resources and open western mar-
kets. The new western states were more than willing, and to spur
their development they followed Colorado's lead in handing out
eminent domain to practically any source of capital that could use
it. 9 Not only were many conventional private uses constitution-
ally declared public, but some constitutions declared that prop-
erty might be taken for private use. Colorado, for instance, al-
lowed takings for "private ways of necessity, . . . reservoirs,
drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others, for
mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary purposes." 00 Idaho's consti-
tution was equally liberal, making mining and irrigation public
uses as well as "any other use necessary to the complete develop-
ment of the material resources of the state."' O'
The burst in private takings after 1865 gave rise to several
interesting doctrinal developments. The New Hampshire high
court led off by upholding a mill act delegation to a general
manufacturing firm, based largely on the particular topographical
nature of the state.' 0s The definition of public use, it argued, de-
pended on the nature of a state's resources and industry. Since
New Hampshire was well endowed with water power, but not
with other natural resources, the state legislature should naturally
take the steps necessary to the thorough exploitation of water
power. Many ofthe western states, primarily in upholding private
irrigation takings, seized on this rationale. A decade later the Ne-
vada high court developed one of the most defensible rationales
and workable tests thus far for private takings. Upholding a stat-
ute authorizing condemnations of land, lumber and other con-
conveniences to particular persons." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.
126, 149 (1886).
99. See generally 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.6; Scheiber, supra notes
81 & 94.
100. As quoted in Scheiber, supra note 81, at 244. See also 2A NICHOLS,
supra note 47, at § 7.6; Bakken, The Impact of the Colorado State Constitution
on Rocky Mountain Constitution Making, 47 COLO. MAGAZINE HIST. 152 (1970)
(as cited in Scheiber, supra note 81).
101. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14 (1890). Regarding Montana practices, see Kaze,
Eminent Domain: Exploitation of Montana's Natural Resources, 35 MoNr. L.
REv. 279 (1974).
102. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444, 461 (1867).
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struction materials by mining companies, the court distinguished
ordinary businesses capable of being operated on any of a variety
of sites from those, like mining, which are site-dependent.108 The
latter could legitimately be delegated eminent domain powers.
The ruling was still underpinned, however, by a general public
benefit analysis, and it was this proposition for which the decision
was almost exclusively cited over the next several decades.
During the same era the federal courts were for the first time
entering the field of eminent domain. Not long after a state court
struck down a state effort to condemn land in behalf of the fed-
eral government,10' the common practice up to then, the Supreme
Court declared that the federal government had eminent domain
power of its own.108 A body of federal doctrine, borrowing heavily
on the state cases, began to develop on the public use require-
ment under the fifth amendment. Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court long avoided taking a position on the narrow use-by-the-
public versus broad public benefit tests, though a tendency to ap-
ply the general one gradually became clear.10 Meanwhile there
was also a growing tendency to challenge state takings under the
fourteenth amendment.10 7 In 1885 for instance, the Supreme
Court held that a New Hampshire mill act delegation to a general
manufacturing company did not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment.108 Its overall standards for both types of takings, state and
federal, tended to be liberal-though judging from the early cases
the federal government also showed some restraint in exercising
the power. In 1896, the Supreme Court finally was forced explic-
itly to hold that the fifth amendment public use requirement ap-
plied to the states through the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause when it, for the first and only known time, invalidated
a state exercise of eminent domain. 10' At issue was a state agency
103. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 411 (1876).
104. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
105. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (postal power includes power
to obtain sites for post offices by eminent domain).
106. Many of the early takings, e.g., for post offices and parks, passed both
tests.
107. See Comment, supra note 76, at 609-10; Berger, supra note 86, at 212-
14.
108. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
109. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); see also Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896); Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
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order, to a railroad that had originally obtained its property by
eminent domain, to allow a private individual the right to build a
grain elevator on railroad land on terms similar to the terms the
railroad had already allowed several others. Without stating a
test, the Court held the state order an unconstitutional taking for
a private use.110 In the ordinary run of cases, however, the Su-
preme Court has shown great deference to state court public use
findings, " " and has not even reviewed such a finding for some
time.112
Though the Court thus established rather loose standards for
the public use requirement, allowing states great policy latitude,
it evidently sought to prevent abuses by tightening up the com-
pensation requirement, awarding for instance, consequential as
well as direct damages." A complementary movement emerged
at the state level. Many states began to require jury trials in cases
of private takings, to limit offsetting valuation allowances, to re-
quire prior payment of damages, and to include a broader variety
of damages in compensation formulas.114 In a sense, however, the
whole process was becoming routinized. The frenetic growth of
the economy from after the Civil War through the first decade of
this century had spent itself and the future of most regions
seemed secure. It no longer was necessary to offer great induce-
ments to secure capital. Much of the fixed capital available in
natural resources had been appropriated and the surplus used for
110. The Court had previously struck down state laws held to impose taxes
for a private purpose, though it is not clear under what constitutional provision.
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. 1
(1884).
111. In 1916 the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, explicitly
repudiated the use-by-the-public test as applied to state takings: "The inadequacy
of the use by the general public as a universal test is established." Mt. Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32
(1916). Earlier it had noted its failure to reverse state court determinations that
takings satisfied the public use requirement. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry.,
208 U.S. 599, 607 (1908). The Court also affirmed its willingness to consider the
particular resources of the state, the "relative importance of industries to the gen-
eral public welfare, and the long-established methods and habits of the people."
Id. at 606.
112. E.g., Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d
379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
113. E.g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). See generally VALUA-
TION, supra note 95, at 35-38.
114. Id. See also Scheiber, supra note 81, at 249.
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industrial investment."' A great part of the infrastructure neces-
sary to support the new industrial system had been established.
Energy producers were taking their place beside the railroads
as expansive, region- or nationwide enterprises. Power companies
had grown up locally and become defined as public utilities by
the end of the century. The reasonableness, indeed necessity, of
giving them eminent domain in urban areas had been manifest,
for without it they evidently would not have been able to operate
economically. The courts gradually rationalized such grants by
noting that the product-electricity or gas-was used by the pub-
lic though the physical plant might not be."" Soon, however, in-
tracity distribution networks became intercity, then interstate.
Interstate transmission systems create some problems of legal
logic, since users are often citizens of states other than the one
granting the eminent domain power. The courts generally have
upheld such takings, occasionally invoking such dubious justifica-
tions as what one commentator has called the "purely hypotheti-
cal right of the farmers along the transmission line to insist that
the power be stepped down and made available to them, 1117 and
generally emphasizing the public service nature of the corpora-
tions involved-though the -: logic again becomes somewhat
strained. 18 Telegraph and telephone companies have undergone
parallel growth and integration, and have received equally solici-
tous treatment by the courts.
The salient fact about the condition of* the country at the
turn of the century was that an integrated, national, and heavily
115. For an exemplary analysis, see J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
181-83 (1964). Calling natural resources "capital" is of course a loose usage, and is
inconsistent with formal Marxian analysis. Nonetheless, the basic notion that nat-
ural resource policies are in fact capital allocation policies seems a very useful one
and deserves further inquiry.
116. See cases cited in 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at §§ 7.522 (light and
power) & 7.523 (gas, petroleum, and oil). It may be noted, parenthetically, that
the development of centralized power distribution systems, and particularly of
hydro-electric power, made the mill dam problems obsolete. The same local power
could still be provided essentially to support advanced, privately held manufactur-
ing concerns. But first it entered the undifferentiated mass of available energy, to
which the entire public would theoretically, and more or less practically, have ac-
cess. Therefore it became most difficult to mount any serious public use challenge.
117. See Nichols, supra note 85, at 623, and text accompanying footnotes
144-45 infra.
118. See, e.g., Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1032 (1934).
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industrial economy had been established. Though legal commen-
tators would continue to fret about such individualized matters as
private road takings for landlocked owners,"' the key uses of the
taking power would increasingly be for more comprehensive and
far-reaching purposes. Eminent domain was becoming an instru-
ment of large, systematically planned projects, often industry-re-
lated and frequently involving a complex form of industry-gov-
ernment cooperation. The major cases have occurred in two areas:
urban redevelopment and infrastructure expansion.
1. Urban redevelopment
Though the courts arguably began deciding urban redevelop-
ment cases involving eminent domain over a hundred years ago,120
the current era of redevelopment cases began with a variety of
government programs instituted during the great depression. The
courts in the earlier cases had often struck down programs be-
cause they involved project ownership or enjoyment by private
individuals."' (Of course this was somewhat inconsistent with
their willingness to find that private ownership and benefit from
public service corporations did not violate the public use require-
ment. 22) A major departure was taken in New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller,"2 a 1936 case in which the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the condemnation of slum property to build
low-income housing. The court found decreasing the juvenile de-
linquency, crime, and disease it believed was caused by slums to
be a broad public benefit satisfying the public use requirement.
Noting the failure of police power and taxation measures to cor-
rect such problems, the court thought that eminent domain could
very properly be used to address them.
The Muller decision was followed closely by the United
States Housing Act of 1937,"' which authorized federal loans and
grants to local housing agencies for slum clearance and low rent
public housing construction. A barrage of cases challenged conse-
119. See, e.g., 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.626.
120. E.g., Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544 (1868).
121. See Nichols, supra note 85, at 624-26.
122. See cases cited in 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.521.
123. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
124. Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (now codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§
1401-1440 (1976)).
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quent condemnations by local housing agencies. The great major-
ity of state courts upheld them, generally following Muller's
broad public benefit approach and sidestepping the argument
that, since each unit would be open to but one family at a time,
the use-by-the-public test would not be met. 115
Still a new barrage of cases resulted from the Housing Act of
1949,126 which provided up to three-fourths federal capitalization
for general urban renewal projects in which condemned slum land
could be resold to private developers and some commercial and
industrial development would be permissible. Though a small
group of state courts invalidated condemnations under the pro-
gram for failing to meet the use-by-the-public requirement, the
majority upheld them, particularly after the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a condemnation in the District of Columbia.
In Berman v. Parker, an owner of a successful department store
in a blighted area sought to enjoin condemnation of his prop-
erty. 27 The owner argued, among other things, that since his
property was not blighted and would be resold to a private devel-
oper, the taking violated general due process requirements as well
as the public use requirement. The Court rejected his challenge,
using very broad language. Speaking of "public purpose" rather
than "public use," it emphasized that Congress must have very
broad discretion in choosing public objectives, that the purpose
of eliminating slum conditions was eminently justifiable, and, as
noted above, intimated that even esthetic purposes might be suf-
ficient to justify a taking.
Though the Court did not directly embrace a broad public
benefit analysis, there could remain little doubt that this was its
approach, at least with regard to federal takings. Since Congress
has a somewhat similar relationship to the District of Columbia
as do state legislatures to their own dominions, and since the
Court has generally shown significant deference to state policies
125. For a complete listing, see 2A NICHOLS, supra note 47, at § 7.5156 n.6.
126. Ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (now codified, as amended,at 42 U.S.C. §§
1441-1490g (1976)). See also RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SoCIAL LEGISLA-
TION 823-85 (1950).
127. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Compare Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115
N.E.2d 659 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1954), in which the court refused to
overturn an administrative finding of blight. The District of Columbia program
previously had been upheld in Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705
(D.D.C. 1953), modified, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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within their own realms, it seems doubful that it would apply a
stricter standard to state takings. One further doctrinal dimen-
sion of the decision should be noted. The Court explicitly carried
through a growing tendency2 8 to equate the public use test with a
basic constitutional power analysis. Thus if a government instru-
mentality can legitimately seek a given objective, the Court said,
it can use eminent domain to accomplish it."'
In the overall development of legitimate public uses, the re-
development strategies satisfying the public use requirement have
progressed from governmentally-operated public housing pro-
grams, taking only blighted property, to privately operated
projects with complex functions taking nonblighted property in
blighted areas. Only South Carolina still holds Berman-type tak-
ings to fail its public use test.130 Though no logical limits are evi-
dent in the cases, it nonetheless remains to be seen how far courts
will be willing to go in allowing local development authorities to
condemn property for commercial purposes.
Efforts to take productive properties in nonblighted areas to
further private industrial or commercial redevelopment plans
have had mixed success. A few states have found insufficient pub-
lic use justifications and invalidated such takings,8 1 while most
have upheld them based on broad public benefit analyses, often
stressing local employment benefits.1 2 Perhaps the most intrigu-
128. Comment, supra note 76.
129. This tendency had been foreshadowed in United States v. Carmack, 329
U.S. 230 (1946), where the Court's central concern was whether due process re-
quirements had been met. It portrayed a taking as a legislative undertaking, which
only had to be material to the prosperity of the community.
130. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956). Georgia
and Florida had originally invalidated such takings, then reversed their positions,
Georgia acting by constitutional amendment. See generally 2A NICHOLS, supra
note 47, at § 7.5156.
131. City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967);
Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959) (effort to condemn
agricultural and residential lands for resale as industrial property failed public use
test).
132. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 87 (1976);
Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278
(1975); Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379,
190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 1, appeal dismissed 375 U.S. 78 (1963); Cannata v.
City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dis-
missed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962).
1980]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ing case in the latter group is Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v.
Port of New York Authority, 3s in which the condemnation of
property to build the World Trade Center was challenged. The
New York high court found the "improvement of the Port of New
York by facilitating the flow of commerce and centralizing all ac-
tivity incident thereto. . . a public purpose supporting the con-
demnation of property for any activity functionally related to
that purpose."1 ' 4 It employed a very broad public benefit analysis
and even noted that the "history of western civilization demon-
strates the cause and effect relationship between a great port and
a great city."' 5
Though the implications of the type of economic arrange-
ment involved cannot be fully analyzed here, it should be noted
that Courtesy Sandwich may reflect a new stage in the develop-
ment of state-economy relationships. While the nominal chal-
lenger was a quaintly-named and perhaps even family-owned bus-
iness, much of the opposition to the project came from far more
powerful interests, primarily the city's major real estate firms.'3
The project the government undertook in building the World
Trade Center was so large that its office space alone would exceed
the total in cities the size of Boston.3 7 Yet the state legislature's
authorization to carry out such a massive intervention reflects the
fact that it had the strong support of other major sectors of capi-
tal and labor, which evidently saw it as necessary, or at least help-
ful, to the continued viability of the New York economy. This
type of thoroughgoing government-economy partnership is per-
haps presaged by several noteworthy infrastructure expansion
projects.
133. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 78 (1963).
134. Id. at 389, 190 N.E.2d at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The court also found
the purpose of raising revenue from rentals to private parties "incidental" to the
primary public purpose of centralizing port functions and improving the economic
conditions of the city, and therefore valid. Judge Van Voorhis, dissenting alone,
thought the public use test not met because the statute "put the Port Authority in
the real estate business."
135. Id. at 388, 190 N.E.2d at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
136. See O'Donnell, Skyscraper Controversy, Wall St. J., March 5, 1964, at
12, cols. 2-3.
137. Id.
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2. Infrastructure expansion
Several major undertakings after World War I made exten-
sive use of eminent domain without incurring significant chal-
lenges. Most notable are the interstate highway system author-
ized in 1944,18 the construction of which has thus far cost nearly
$100 billion, and the Saint Lawrence Seaway, completed in 1959,
which has played a significant role in maintaining a vital indus-
trial link between the Northeast and the Midwest.
Several less ambitious projects, however, have been more
controversial. Brown v. United States, frequently cited as estab-
lishing the legitimacy of "substitute condemnation," involved the
congressionally authorized taking of three-fourths of a town by
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in order to build a reser-
voir, as well as the additional taking of a roughly equivalent
amount of nearby land to which the condemned part of the town
and its buildings were to be moved and reunited with the part left
intact. 38 ' Finding the taking of the town valid, the Supreme Court
also upheld the taking of the neighboring land, finding it "so
closely connected with the acquisition of the district to be
flooded, and so necessary to the carrying out of the project," that
the public use of the reservoir also justified the additional tak-
ing."140 It added that the additional taking was the "best means of
making the parties whole. '1 4'
Direct congressional authorization to use eminent domain
was lacking in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, as was the
neat plan simply to preserve a community."1 2 In this case a reser-
voir project would cut off the only road to a small village. The
construction of a new road was out of the question under wartime
conditions. Local governmental bodies objected to TVA's offer to
pay damages for the road as inadequate to cover the costs of pro-
viding standard governmental services to the newly isolated com-
munity. Eventually, TVA condemned all the land owned by mem-
bers of the village and joined the land with a neighboring national
138. The qualification here of course is that esthetic easements authorized by
affiliated programs have faced rougher going. See text accompanying notes 71-74
supra.
139. 263 U.S. 78 (1923).
140. Id. at 81.
141. Id. at 83.
142. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
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park. The Supreme Court's eventual upholding of the condemna-
tions had two important effects. First, it expanded the scope of
takings that could be justified by any given public purpose, since
the use to which the condemned land would be put (a park) had
little to do with the public purpose justifying the reservoir pro-
ject. Second, it indicated that federal agencies could employ emi-
nent domain broadly in carrying out their missions. TVA has
since executed more thoroughgoing projects and has not faced a
successful challenge on general public use grounds.1 4 3
In the present era eminent domain is perhaps most impor-
tant with regard to energy transportation and distribution. As
noted above, takings for such purposes have long been established
and it had pehaps seemed that most of the problems were dis-
posed of. But the relentless expansion and centralization of en-
ergy usage, the exhaustion of local energy sources in many areas,
the development of new distribution technologies, "4 and the in-
creasing value of land and environmental amenities have com-
bined to bring energy transportation problems once again to the
fore. Square Butte Electric Cooperative v. Hilken1" involved
right-of-way condemnations for a direct current power line to
carry electricity from a new coal-fired power plant in west-central
North Dakota roughly 600 miles to a load center in far eastern
Minnesota. The project was being carried out by a Minnesota
wholesale utility cooperative and financed by a privately-held
Minnesota utility. In part for financing reasons, the wholesale co-
operative organized a North Dakota corporation, having only one
employee and a total capitalization of $10,000, to carry out the
project. Because it was a cooperative under North Dakota law,
the new corporation qualified to produce electricity and exercise
143. Both Brown and Welch involved hydroelectric projects, arguably fairly
well-connected to TVA's original mandate. However, there is some question
whether TVA was ever authorized to sell electricity. See Wirtz, The Legal Frame-
work of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 TENN. L. REv. 574 (1976). When the
Authority expanded into coal and nuclear projects, however, it was also sustained.
United States v. An Easement and Right-of-Way Over Two Tracts of Land, 246 F.
Supp. 263 (W.D. Ky. 1965), afl'd, 375 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1967) (steam plant and
transmission lines upheld); United States v. Three Tracts of Land, 377 F. Supp.
631 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (condemnation for Bellafonte Nuclear Plant upheld); Rain-
bow Realty Co. v. TVA, 124 F. Supp. 436 (M.D. Tenn. 1954) (condemnation for
coal-fired plant upheld).
144. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
145. 244 N.W.2d 519 (N.D. 1976).
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eminent domain in the state without oversight by the Public Ser-
vice Commission.14 6
The entire output of the new plant was committed to the pri-
vately held utility for the first seven years of generation. Thereaf-
ter, the wholesale cooperative would have periodic options on por-
tions of the output, gradually increasing from thirty percent after
seven years to fifty-one percent after seventeen years. Four of the
wholesaler's member cooperatives and half of its endpoint users
were from North Dakota. Since exercising an option would re-
quire majority vote of the member cooperatives, Minnesota inter-
ests could formally control the output of the plant. The facts that
the line was direct current (making tie-ins at any intermediate
point unusually expensive) and that the only planned transformer
was to be located in far eastern Minnesota made the likelihood
that any of the project's electricity would actually be used in
North Dakota rather low. Nonetheless, both Minnesota utilities
were members of the regional power pool from which North Da-
kota utilities might obtain extra electricity in emergencies.
The primary purpose of the project was to supply the rapidly
growing power needs of private taconite producers in Minnesota.
Evidence at trial indicated that the private utility was, roughly
twice as large as the wholesale cooperative and that it projected
far more massive load growth than did the cooperative,147 again
making it seem somewhat unlikely that the cooperative would ex-
ercise its option and forego the relatively high premium it could
expect for selling the electricity to the private utility.
In ruling on contested right-of-way takings the trial court
held that while the proposed route met the statutbry requirement
of being "compatible with the greatest public benefit and the
least private injury,"14 8 the proposed taking did not meet the
public use requirement. " ' The utility had alleged a panoply of
ostensible benefits to North Dakota:
a back-up reserve of power, from which North Dakota member
utilities might draw in emergency; a potential reduction in electric-
ity costs for North Dakota consumers; a potential option to supply
a portion of the electricity sent over the ... line to North Dakota
146. N.D. CENr. CODE § 49-02-01.1 (1978).
147. 224 N.W.2d 529.
148. Id. at 521.
149. Id.
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consumers; a potential source of electricity to meet North Dakota's
future demands; and a stabilization of [the power supply] in North
Dakota. 50
But the trial court found the alleged benefits too remote, specula-
tive, and indirect to support the finding of substantial public ben-
efit it thought required by North Dakota law.
On appeal, a sharply divided state supreme court reversed
the trial court's public use holding. All of the justices accepted
the prevailing plurality's statement of the substantive law:
[Tihe following elements must be present for a public use to exist
in the state where the property sought to be condemned lies. First,
the public must have either a right to benefit guaranteed by regula-
tory control through a public service commission or an actual bene-
fit. Second, although other states may also be benefited, the public
in the state which authorizes the taking must derive a substantial
and direct benefit, something greater than an indirect advantage.
Third, the public benefit, while not confined exclusively to the
state authorizing the use of the power, is nonetheless inextricably
attached to the territorial limits of the state because the state's
sovereignty is also so constrained.' 5 '
The prevailing plurality acknowledged the absence of bene-
fits guaranteed by regulatory control, the traditional public utility
justification, but it found the requirements of actual, direct, and
substantial benefits satisfied. To do so the plurality overrode the
trial court's findings of fact. Specifically, it found the addition of
the plant's capacity to the reserve power supply of the region, the
rather tenuous possibility that the direct current line would stab-
lize "low frequency oscillations" in the regional system (an argu-
ment the utility had not made on appeal), the possibility that the
cooperative might exercise its options in the future, the possibil-
ity that the power so obtained would not be as expensive as new
capacity, and the possibility that another plant might be built
alongside the first to serve North Dakota consumers sufficient, cu-
mulatively, to satisfy the public use requirement. " The concur-
ring opinion disagreed with the reversals of fact findings, but
found that the trial court had erred on issues of law by allocating
150. Note, Interstate Public Use: An Issue Occuring in Condemnation for
Interstate Power Lines, 52 N.D. L. REV. 563, 565-66 (1976).
151. 224 N.W.2d 525 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 530.
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the burden of proving a public use to the condemning utility and
requiring a showing of direct rather than indirect benefits. (In the
latter regard, the opinion appears internally contradictory."')
The joint dissents, as noted, accepted the plurality statement
of law, but found the standard unsatisfied. They found any public
benefits far too "remote, indirect, incidental, and speculative,"''
and the general concept of public benefit pushed beyond any use-
fulness as a limitation on the taking power.1 55
This generally unexceptional case has been worth discussing
at some length for two reasons. First, it raises the same basic ana-
lytical problems which have troubled public use doctrine from its
beginnings. On the one hand, it seems clear that there will indeed
be some "public benefit" from the project; on the other, if this
public benefit is sufficient to justify the exercise of eminent do-
main, is there any even moderately salutary project which can be
denied the power on public use grounds? Some public benefit can
be found in virtually any capital development program. Second,
however, the fact situation is also relatively typical of the societal
context in which eminent domain now is used. The power is
widely available, it frequently serves major long-distance resource
transfers between multistate and sometimes multinational enter-
prises, it is an important component in relatively complicated in-
vestment decisions and it is relatively lightly regulated and re-
viewed. The question remains whether matters should be other-
wise, and how.
III. STALKING THE ELUSIVE LIMITING PRINCIPLE
A. Current Status of Public Use Doctrine
Though it cannot quite be said that the public use require-
ment no longer exists for eminent domain,156 it imposes very little
153. Id. at 533.
154. Id. at 536-37.
155. Id. at 539.
156. It would hardly do to omit the oft-quoted words:
Legal doctrines usually die quietly, if slowly. Their demise is generally
accompanied by no more than soft sighs of relief at the courts' final ac-
knowledgement of decay. But the theory of "public use" as a limitation on
eminent domain . . .bulked so large in its prime and has taken so long in
dying that, at the risk of disturbing the deathwatch, a few final words might
be in order.
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systematic limitation on the power. Takings by government are
virtually invulnerable to public use challenge. Governmental or
not, practically all takings are subject to the liberal public benefit
standard. Conceptually the public benefit standard is amorphous
enough to allow practically any taking, but it leaves room for the
courts to invalidate takings on occasion. The use-by-the-public
standard, on the other hand, has been invoked to uphold takings
that meet the test but has not been the primary ground for invali-
dating a significant taking for quite some time. 157
The net result is that analytically almost any taking can meet
the public use requirement, except perhaps the bald transfer of
property from one private holder to another without some super-
vening governmental purpose. The rather close margins of even
this exception are indicated by the landlocked-owner and urban
redevelopment case. For the most part then, the public use re-
quirement operates as an incremental and somewhat idosyncratic
restraint--a slight added drag on takings, the exact operation of
which is somewhat unpredictable. 156 Berman made explicit what
The Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of public use. Most
state courts have arrived at the same conclusion, although rarely with so
much directness. Doubtless the doctrine will continue to be evoked nostal-
gically in dicta and may even be employed authoritatively in rare, atypical
situations. Kinder hands, however, would accord it the permanent intern-
ment in the digests that is so long overdue.
Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 614 (1949).
157. In any event, it is often argued that a pure use-by-the-public approach
probably would be unworkable, since it would permit takings for public places like
hotels and theaters but forbid them for well-established, seemingly reasonable
uses like roads for landlocked owners. This problem was noted at least as early as
Dayton Gold & Silver:
If public occupation and enjoyment of the object for which the land is
to be condemned furnishes the only and true test for the right of eminent
domain, then the legislature would certainly have the constitutional author-
ity to condemn the lands of any private citizen for the purpose of building
hotels and theaters. . . . It is certain that this view, if literally carried out
to the utmost extent, would lead to very absurd results, if it did not entirely
destroy the security of the private rights of individuals.
Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 410-11 (1876). More-
over, as described supra, the rise of the use-by-the-public doctrine in the early
nineteenth century was accompanied by a massive expansion in the actual deploy-
ment of eminent domain.
158. Compare Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12
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appears to have been an accomplished state of affairs: if a pur-
pose is within the governmental power, eminent domain probably
may be used to achieve it.1" The main question is not whether a
taking is for a "public" purpose, but whether it is for a legitimate
purpose. By retaining the public use requirement without clearly
defining it, the courts have retained, perhaps cannily, the prerog-
ative of reviewing the legitimacy and wisdom of particular
purposes.
B. The Desirability of a Special Standard for Eminent
Domain
Since the public use requirement appears to be largely a judi-
cial creation, its retention by the courts is not particularly sur-
prising. But is there a justification for it? Takings, after all, are
already subject to compensation and ordinary due process re-
quirements. Is there a particular danger in eminent domain that
mandates stricter scrutiny? Are takings intrinsically amenable to
a special form of analysis?
Though these questions have not been widely debated, the
commentators discussing them have come out on all sides. Many
of the civil law writers thought special constraints should be
placed on the power so that property would be taken only for
relatively worthy purposes, though they did not agree on how
such purposes should be defined.16 0 Many modern commentators
find nothing special about the use of eminent domain. Stoebuck,
for instance, speculates that the main danger in eminent domain
would be its capacity to tyrannize, but considers the danger
hollow.' 61 He argued that as long as they are compensated, con-
demnees are as likely to find takings unoppressive as to find them
oppressive. Sometimes they will be happy, even quite happy, to
get market value for property, and sometimes not. Eminent do-
main therefore is a dull instrument for accomplishing political op-
pression, no better than any other governmental power. And since
N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963) and Hogue v. Port of Seattle,
54 Wash. 2d 799, 391 P.2d 171 (1959) with Square Butte Elec. Cooperative v.
Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519 (N.D. 1976).
159. Supra note 73.
160. See notes 24-26 supra.
161. Stoebuck, supra note 15. Stoebuck is responding to Sax's concern that
eminent domain spends its force on a single owner. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 53-54 (1964).
1980)
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
it is as appropriate to governmental undertakings as any other
power, it should be scrutinized on similar terms. It has even been
suggested that takings should be scrutinized less rigorously than
ordinary tax expenditures, since the condemnee will at least re-
ceive compensation while taxpayers will simply be out the money
involved in improper expenditures. 62
There are also strong arguments for subjecting exercises of
eminent domain to closer scrutiny."' Not only does the tendency
not to compensate for relocation expenses or loss of business
goodwill tend to make indemnification less than complete, but
condemnations often are not subject to the political checks facing
more general types of governmental actions. Takings typically af-
fect a relatively small number of condemnees, who are often
poorly organized and politically ineffectual.1 6 ' Moreover, exactly
what land will be condemned is frequently not known when
projects which will involve condemnations are authorized; there-
fore potential condemnees are unable to plead their causes during
the decision process. Finally, an increasing amount of condemna-
tion is federally authorized or funded, thus making opposition by
affected parties less likely to be effective. But if special standards
were to be applied to takings, what form might they take?
C. Alternative Standards
1. A stricter public benefit test
Historically, the concept of public benefit has been framed
quite broadly. In upholding a water company's taking of an ease-
ment to lay water pipes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
162. 1 COOLEY, TAXATION § 176 (4th ed. 1942).
163. See, e.g., Comment, State Constitutional Limitations on Eminent Do-
main, 77 HARV. L.R. 717 (1964).
164. Moreover, condemnations may be motivated by such dubious purposes
as racial exclusion. Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Development Corp., 26 Ill. 2d
296, 186 N.E.2d 360 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1963), involved condemna-
tion of land for a park immediately after announcement of plans to build a ra-
cially integrated housing development on the site. A referendum the previous year
had rejected a bond issue for the park. The court essentially refused to consider
interests beyond the condemnee's ownership interest and held him to have a cause
of action only by showing deprivation to be the "sole and exclusive purpose" of
the condemnation. A showing that the park would actually be created, conversely,
would inherently validate the taking. Accord, City of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein,
329 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
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peated a common formulation: "if the proposed improvement
tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies,
and promote the productive power of any considerable number of
the community, the use is public."' 5 In its loosest form, particu-
larly if legislative or administrative findings of fact are accepted,
this standard will sustain virtually any taking that can be con-
nected somehow to community betterment. At the same time,
however, courts retain some latitude whether to be satisfied with
a colorable public benefit or to require something more
substantial.
More strictly, although they might sometimes need legislative
or constitutional authorization, the courts could require that a
taking be necessary to carrying out a public purpose. 166 Connecti-
cut's proposed 1965 constitution had a provision reading: "No
property shall be taken for public use unless the taking be neces-
sary for such use, and then, only upon payment of just conpensa-
tion.' '1 7 Presumably under such a provision courts would require
condemnors to show that their projects could not reasonably be
carried out without the condemnation.
Montana and North Dakota take a parallel but somewhat
stricter approach. The North Dakota statute is noted in Square
Butte.'6" The Montana provision is virtually identical: "in all
cases where land is required for public use, .. it must be located
in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest
public good and the least private injury."' 0 Thus the condemnor
has a duty to minimize the cost and maximize the benefit of a
taking. This is an explicit and rather stringent cost-benefit test.
165. Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 388, 393-94, 69 A. 870,
872 (1908).
166. Courts at present are split on how closely adminstrative takings determi-
nations are to be reviewed. The general view appears to be that an arbitrariness
test should be used. See, e.g., Urban Renewal Agency v. lacommetti, 79 Nev. 113,
379 P.2d 466 (1963); Grisanti v. Cleveland, 181 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 68 (1962).
167. C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 889 (2d ed. 1975). Berger notes
that the Connecticut Urban Renewal Association spent large sums to fight the
provision. In the end, the proposed constitution was rejected.
168. Square Butte Elec. Cooperative v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519, 522 (N.D.
1976).
169. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9906 (1964). This strict provision to some
extent reflects the backlash that occurred in Montana, which was once at the fore-
front of states granting eminent domain to any and every interest.
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The question is not simply whether a taking's benefits exceed its
costs, but whether the taking is optimal to carrying out the pro-
ject. Despite the formally strict standard however, costs and ben-
efits are notoriously difficult to estimate and the courts neces-
sarily will have some latitude in deciding how closely to second-
guess condemnations. It might be argued that by requiring opti-
mal decisions the standard is unworkable anyway, but this is not
necessarily the case.
In perhaps its most activist foray into administrative decision
making, the Montana Supreme Court considered a State Highway
Commission condemnation to build a 14.2-mile road directly par-
allel to an existing one. 170 The Commission had not seriously con-
sidered whether the existing road feasibly could be improved, and
the new road was to cut across prime farm acreage. Presuming
both possible roadways equal on the public benefit side, the court
ordered the Commission to perform a detailed study on the pri-
vate injury question and not to condemn the new right-of-way
unless it would cause less private injury than use of the existing
one. While a more conventional cost-benefit analysis would also
have allowed the benefits of the two roads to be discounted for
potentially differing values like future mainenance costs, the
court's application of the limitation clause appears reasonable. It
forced the Commission to take the constitutional requirement se-
riously and not to use the condemnation power at its apparent
whim.
The Montana, North Dakota, and Connecticut provisions
could also be combined in something like the following form to
provide perhaps the strictest curb on takings which still allows a
broad variety of purposes: "In every case where property is to be
taken for a public purpose, the taking must be reasonably neces-
sary to carrying out that purpose and the property must be se-
lected so as to provide the greatest public good and the least pri-
vate injury." This formulation may seem little different from the
Montana and North Dakota provisions since they arguably also
contain a necessity requirement, particularly as applied in the
case just discussed. The Montana road case however, had an un-
usual fact situation in the prior existence of an almost identical
facility. The primary reason for requiring that a taking be neces-
170. State Highway Comm'n v. Danielsen, 146 Mont. 539, 409 P.2d 443
(1965).
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sary would be to prohibit condemnations where equivalent prop-
erty could reasonably be obtained on comparable terms on the
market, which the Montana provision does not do explicitly.
This approach potentially involves significant implementa-
tion problems, particularly with level of scrutiny and burden of
proof, but a bare outline of how it might be structured can be
suggested. First, a taking by a duly authorized agency or instru-
mentality would be presumptively valid. In order to overturn it a
challenger would have to show by clear preponderance of evi-
dence either that alternative, equally satisfactory property is
available for purchase at market value or that the taking of an
alternative, equally satisfactory property would involve substan-
tially less private injury. Private injury could be shown in either
economic or noneconomic terms. For instance, a taking requiring
that a family relocate could involve more private injury than one
involving property of the same value but not requiring anyone to
move. The superiority of the challenger's alternative would have
to be clear and not merely colorable.
To overcome a prima facie showing of nonnecessity or of a
superior alternative, an agency would have to demonstrate a sub-
stantial consideration supporting its decision, for example a non-
frivolous, nonarbitrary reason why the property requiring the
family to move is in fact superior for its purposes. Ordinarily the
agency should be able to translate such reasons into cost factors.
To prevail over the prima facie showing, those cost factors would
have to be more than speculative and would have to be conse-
quential relative to the size and overall purposes of the project.
Finally, if the challenger's case proposed condemnation of other
properties, owners of those properties would be subject to com-
pulsory joinder in order to ensure consideration of all factors rele-
vant to the decision. An order of the court would then be binding
on all parties involved.
To be sure, a proposal like this also raises the prospect of a
substantial increase in litigation. While probably diminishing
public use challenges in the old mode, it would allow significantly
expanded judicial oversight of particular takings decisions. With
proper procedural structuring, however, the probable rise in liti-
gation would not be significant. The key would be to make tak-
ings decisions relatively difficult to assail, but still vulnerable
enough to force condemnors to act prudently. The best way to do
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this appears to be to allow the challenger to attack a particular
decision, but to require a showing of a substantially better alter-
native to invalidate the taking. Presumably the very possibility of
effective challenge would constrain parties with condemnation
power to use it sparingly. Since more than valuation, which is
fairly predictable, would be at issue, the costs of litigation could
rapidly make it more cost effective to purchase other property on
the market or at least to select for condemnation property likely
to result in the least disruption to other parties.
Still, it might be asserted that cost considerations,,, especially
the one-time, relatively minor ones involved in many property ac-
quisitions, are often not very effective in channeling the decisions
of large governmental agencies or powerful, often quasi-monopo-
listic corporations. While this may be true, the framework just
proposed should nonetheless significantly curb the effects of cost-
unresponsiveness by simply invalidating indefensible takings. No
longer would any taking become immune simply by being for a
public use or purpose. It could be challenged on grounds of its
necessity and appropriateness.
There are at least two kinds of problems, however, that
neither this nor any other proposal limited to eminent domain
can adequately deal with. First, it will still be easier to take prop-
erty from poorer or more poorly organized segments of society
than from others. Even the relatively strict limitation on takings
set out above requires court challenge for effective implementa-
tion. As will be seen below, there is some evidence to indicate that
the poor generally fare less well than the rich in condemnation
proceedings, probably due to their more limited legal sophistica-
tion and resources. It might well be as logical for a condemnor to
minimize the problems of challenge by taking property from rela-
tively poor and powerless parties as by taking the most appropri-
ate property necessary for the particular project.1 7 1
Second, even under the strictly framed standard, it would be
difficult for courts to decide cases like Square Butte1 2 differently.
The court in that case found the cost-benefit standard for the
proposed route satisfied; if the project was to be carried out, the
171. See text accompanying notes 192-99 infra.
172. Square Butte Elec. Cooperative v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519 (N.D. 1976).
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proposed means were acceptable. 1 7 To invalidate the Project a
court would therefore have to find it unnecessary. In cases which
involve complex demand projections, numerous but ambiguous al-
ternatives, and major amounts of investment, as do most impor-
tant eminent domain projects, courts can be expected to resist
second-guessing projects that comport generally with legislatively
approved purposes. Although courts are willing occasionally to
make a somewhat legislative decision by finding a failure to meet
the public use requirement, it is quite doubtful that they would
be willing or able to evaluate the broad necessity of capital
projects on a regular basis.
Thus both the narrow and broad forms of general necessity
review face significant limitations as policy correctives. One more
conception of necessity, however, the site-dependency rationale
first propounded in Dayton Gold and Silver Mining, 1 7  merits
consideration.
2. A site-dependency or monopoly test
Today's most common justification for eminent domain is the
"hold-out problem." Stated in lay terms it is the possibility that
an owner of property necessary to the completion of a substantial
project either will refuse to sell and thus entirely thwart the pro-
ject's possible benefits or will hold out for an exorbitant price and
thereby "blackmail" society for a higher than fair price. In eco-
nomic terms the problem is defined as a seller holding out for a
higher price from a buyer known to be "assembling" properties
for a particular configuration (e.g., a railroad right-of-way) than
the seller would ask from a buyer not suspected of planning such
an assembly. Where hold-out behavior occurs, fewer projects re-
quiring assembly will be carried out than if sellers sold at their
true-"atomistic"-prices, and the net production available to so-
ciety will be lower than if goods were compared, bought, and sold
at their true opportunity costs. Production is thus expected to be
sub- or at least nonoptimal. 17 5
173. Id. at 527-30.
174. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
175. See F. Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain 7 (December
1973) (unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago Department of Econom-
ics). The hold-out owner is trying to extract an additional "rent" for his property
from the project. If only one or a few owners were to do so the project might still
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Conceptually, the seemingly perfect solution to this problem
is eminent domain, through which a hold-out owner can be forced
to transfer property at market, rather than hold-out, value. It can
be argued that eminent domain is appropriate wherever there is
likely to be a hold-out or monopoly problem-for example where
a mining company wishes to produce a claim but is confronted by
high right-of-way rent demands from a landowner standing be-
tween the mining claim and an essential transportation artery."'
Rather than pay the rent and thus raise costs unnecessarily, or
not produce the claim and thus also contribute to higher mineral
prices, the mining company could use eminent domain to estab-
lish the right-of-way at a fair price. But should an assembler be
granted eminent domain whenever it confronts a potential mo-
nopoly or hold-out problem? The question can best be addressed
by examining a proposal that this is exactly what should be done.
Lawrence Berger proposes to discard the traditional public
use requirement and to grant eminent domain whenever there is a
degree of relative monopoly in landholding and the taking would
lead to substantially increased property values.'" While stan-
dards would be somewhat stricter for private than for public con-
demnors, the category, "public," is defined inclusively. Takings
for railroads, hospitals, streets, hotels, theaters, and industrial
plants would all be public by meeting the criterion of "bene-
fit[ing] large numbers of persons in a nondiscriminatory and
nonexclusionary manner."' 78 Berger justifies this very broad defi-
nition of "public" by arguing that it is "impossible to distinguish
be pursued, but with a slight transfer of income from the assembler to landowners.
With "perfect information," possibly all owners could hold out for precisely their
"shares" of the available rent, and the project could still be completed; yet as soon
as information becomes poor or one owner decides to hold out to get part of a
neighbor's share of the rent as well, the system fails to allocate resources
optimally.
176. Strictly speaking, the monopoly and hold-out problems are not the same,
since hold-out behavior may occur where substitute properties could have been
purchased but the project has progressed sufficiently to make that difficult and to
make it more efficient to pay the owner some rent. No monopoly rents, based for
instance on the absolute uniqueness of the property, need be possible. A hold-out
owner may seek simply to capture part of another owner's share of the rent.
177. L. Berger, supra note 49. It is important to differentiate L. Berger from
C. Berger, supra note 167, whose views on this question appear to be quite
different.
178. Berger, supra note 49, at 225.
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rationally a large plant employing half the town and a railroad
right of way, saying there may be condemnation in the latter case
but not in the former. '"1 79
"Private" takings, "benefit[ing] one, or a relatively limited
number of persons," 180 would have to meet the following criteria.
First, the condemnee would have to hold a monopoly or near mo-
nopoly over the proposed use. 81 By monopoly, Berger generally
means control of the only property on which the project could
reasonably be carried out. In a landlocked owner case, for in-
stance, he simply means the only land on which the condemnor
could afford to pay the costs. Second, "the increase in values to
the properties resulting from the taking should exceed the costs
in making any change in resources.' 82 In a landlocked owner case
this would mean that the increase to the value of the formerly
landlocked property would more than offset the decrease to the
value of the property over which a way is condemned (and, pre-
sumably, the general costs of the process). Third, the "importance
of the condemner's need should outweigh the harm to be inflicted
upon the condemnee."'' 8 Though Berger does not make the
meaning of this criterion clear, he suggests it should be used to
avoid "frivilously motivated" condemnations. As a further way of
avoiding marginal condemnations, Berger thinks "the condemner
should have to pay as compensation, the greater of any increase
in values to his land resulting from the taking, or 150% of the fair
market value of the land taken."1 8'
Berger would apply parallel, but significantly less stringent
requirements to the inclusively defined public takings.
A condemnee monopoly requirement should be imposed but less
strictly enforced. The increase in value test should be used but
only where market or other measures are meaningful. In addition,
there ought to be some showing that the public benefit outweighs
179. Id. at 226.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 235.
182. Id. at 245. It is not entirely clear what values Berger means to include in
this requirement. For instance, earlier in the article he states an apparently nar-
rower test: "the total values of all properties involved after the change in resources
is higher than the total values before the change." Id. at 235. Presumably he sub-
stracts all transaction costs from property values.
183. Id. at 245.
184. Id.
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the harm to the condemnee. Finally a liberalized system of dam-
ages with awards somewhat in excess of fair market value [120 to
150 percent] should be initiated.85
For both types of takings Berger would require damages
somewhat in excess of market value. Though his reasons for doing
so are not articulated, several may be suggested. First, the current
owner of property might value it at more than market value. In-
deed this would be a sign of proper resource distribution, each
holder valuing his resources more than any other potential holder
is willing to pay for them.18 It is of course very difficult to distin-
guish actual personal utility from hold-out behavior. Berger at-
tempts a solution by providing that the present owner would be
more likely to get "fair" compensation and the new owner would
have to pay the full value of the improvement to his property.
Thus biasing the liabilities somewhat against takings would also
contribute to a second consideration: the transaction costs in-
volved in giving up property, arranging to replace it, and so on,
would be avoided in most cases where they were not in fact justi-
fied. Finally, Berger may be seeking to avoid the criticism that his
scheme would open the flood gates to a torrent of takings.
Yet if the floodgates must be held back to some degree, what
is the reason for opening them in the first place? Berger's es-
poused but relatively unsubstantiated grounds are "fairness" and
"economic efficiency.' 8 7 The fairness rationale holds that it does
not seem equitable to give eminent domain to some large-scale
private interests and not to others. Since a factory can provide as
much economic benefit to a community as a railroad, the factory
should have as ready access to eminent domain as the railroad.'"
This supposed equity argument depends, however, on some major
185. Id.
186. See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39-44 (2d ed. 1977). As
Posner notes, the value placed on property by an eccentric is no less valid in pure
economic terms than any other value.
If I refuse to sell for less than $25,000 a house that no one else would pay
more than $15,000 for, it does not follow that I am irrational, even if no
"objective" factors such as moving expenses justify my insisting on such a
premium. It follows only that I value the house more than other people.
The extra value I place on the property has the same status in economic
analysis as any other value.
Id. at 40.
187. Berger, supra note 49, at 226.
188. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
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efficiency assumptions. First, it assumes that monopoly and hold-
out problems will be as serious for factories is for railroads. This
seems a dubious assumption, since railroads are ordinarily a good
deal more site-dependent than factories and must assemble far
larger numbers of properties to carry out most projects. 5 9 There-
fore the probabilities of encountering hold-out owners who will
drive assembly costs significantly above opportunity costs are
much higher for railroads.
Second, the argument that eminent domain should be given
to factories-rather than taken away from railroads, for in-
stance-assumes that using eminent domain in fact contributes
to economic efficiency. This is a hypothetical and vulnerable as-
sumption. Condemning property inherently entails special costs,
for example those of a fairly substantial fact-finding and adjudi-
cation process. Other possible costs considered below are less ob-
vious, but estimates of the costs and efficiency of eminent domain
need not remain entirely speculative. At least some data compar-
ing the costs of land acquisition with and without eminent do-
main already exist.
Munch has studied and compared property assemblies ac-
complished through condemnation and through market purchase,
and her research indicates little difference in total costs.1e0
Though her study is too complicated to be fully recounted here,
several of its main findings should be noted. First, though prices
paid in market assembly tend to exceed market values, "eminent
domain does not substantially reduce the total cost of land, if at
all."' 1 Second, "[t]he main impact of eminent domain is in the
distribution of the assembly rent: high valued parcels capture
more than their proportionate share, at the expense of low valued
parcels, which get less than market value. In the market assem-
blies, the distribution is apparently random, with the bias, if any,
in favor of low valued parcels."1 s' In a word, eminent domain does
189. It also bears noting that railroad right-of-way condemnations are not
nearly as common these days as factory expansions.
190. F. Munch, supra note 175.
191. Id. at 81-82.
192. Id. at 83. In estimating the coefficients of the biased prices, Munch
found that (in 1972 prices), "as a rough approximation, a $7,000 parcel receives
about $5,000, a $13,000 property breaks even, and a $40,000 property may get two
or three times its market value." Id. at 60.
In addition she found that while "eminent domain does reduce the rise in
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not demonstrably contribute to efficiency and appears to bias
payments in favor of more expensive properties. There are of
course qualifications to Munch's study, the main ones being that
her sample of market assemblies is not large and that the study is
limited to properties located in Chicago. Even on relatively nar-
row economic grounds, though, it casts significant doubt on the
somewhat sanguine assumption that broader dissemination of
eminent domain would contribute to economic efficiency.
In addition, eminent domain may impose significant non-
market costs. An important reason high valued properties receive
proportionately more than low valued ones in condemnations is
probably that owners of more expensive properties have better
access to the legal resources necessary to obtain favorable com-
pensation. To further expand legal intervention in the property
transfer process would diminish the value of ownership relative to
that of legal sophistication and resources, which are distributed
perhaps more unequally than property itself. It would thus con-
tribute to making this society somewhat more inegalitarian than
it already is and would add nonmonetary regressive effects to the
monetary ones.
Berger's scheme also is subject to several other serious criti-
cisms. Essentially, it puts too small a burden on the prospective
condemnor, particularly if it can qualify as "public." If a factory
wishes to expand and finds its way blocked by an unwilling
farmer, all it need show to condemn his property is that it is the
only land onto which the factory could reasonably expand and
that the net value of the two properties would increase.198 In the
process the factory has almost complete latitude in defining the
relevant options. There might be an alternative, like relocating,
that would be more expensive for the factory but impose lower
total costs upon the community. With the factory in control of
prices over time, i.e., the gains from settling later, . . . this net effect is com-
pounded from some prices being depressed over time-those going to court-while
some parcels settling out of court do succeed in holding out for higher prices." Id.
at 82-83.
193. In theory, Berger leaves open an escape hatch in his third criterion and
requires that the public benefit outweigh the harm to the condemnee. In practice
this standard would seem either to be conclusory, the relative benefits being de-
cided by the increase in propery value, or to be very arbitrary, depending on the
individual values of judges. All but the least competent courts would probably try
to avoid the latter alternative.
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the relevant information it would be next to impossible for the
farmer to prove such a case. An attempt to do so would be irrele-
vant anyway, since alternative possibilities are not a factor in
Berger's scheme. The liberal compensation requirement would
not always solve the problems either, since the twenty to fifty
percent over market value could easily be less than the difference
between the net social costs of the expansion and an alternative
project. Moreover, in all practicality it should be noted that the
court or agency in charge of the condemnation proceedings might
thwart the liberal compensation provision by simply decreasing
base property value in order to make net compensation equal to
what it sees as an appropriate market value. 194
Finally, a large corporation will often have significant ability
to manipulate the property market. Depending on the corpora-
tion's use of its property, and perhaps its policies with respect to
surrounding properties, it could exercise significant influence on
the "market value" of the farmer's property. Giving it condemna-
tion power would mean giving it the right to take the farmer's
property at slightly over the "market value" it may have largely
determined. The farmer, if left alone, might bargain for a higher
share of the value of his property to the factory (which in reality
might be many times its market value). In pure economic terms,
there is nothing to say that the factory, rather than the farmer, is
entitled to that rent.19' One distribution of the rent is no more
economically efficient than any other.
Berger's proposed scheme, accordingly, is not as he would
claim merely a neutral mechanism for increasing economic effi-
ciency. It is a significant shift in property entitlements from cur-
rent owners to prospective buyers. If any prospective buyer values
a piece of property over its nominal market value and the
changed use is likely to raise its market value, the prospective
buyer may take the property even if it is worth more to the cur-
rent owner than its market value in the new use. Further, certain
types of prospective buyers will benefit disproportionately. The
definition of "public" makes eminent domain available on espe-
cially favorable terms to large-scale, relatively centralized organi-
zations. The large department store, for instance, could exercise
194. See, e.g., C. Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical
Look into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 430 (1967).
195. See Munch, supra note 175, ch. 2.
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eminent domain on more favorable terms than the small corner
grocery.'96 Indeed, it probably could condemn the corner grocery
if it wished.
The nondiscrimination, nonexclusion requirement, 197 more-
over, is not sufficient to eliminate another probable bias in bene-
fits. Large clubs, particularly the kind well-financed enough to
seek large property expansions, will often have memberships bi-
ased toward the upper socio-economic strata. The public golf club
Berger uses in one hypothetical, 98 though legally open to all, will
typically consist of those who can afford and whose peer groups
encourage membership.1 9" Giving the club eminent domain gives
it the right to take the farmer's land whenever it is willing to pay
more than the market price for farmland, but does not necessarily
contribute much to "efficiency" as it is often thought of in rela-
tion to production. While conventional economic doctrine does
not posit that one type of purchase (e.g., for farming) at a given
price brings more utility than another (e.g., for a golf club),
neither does it make the assumption that an increase in the mar-
ket value of property always equals an increase in utility. This is
because, as already noted, the current owner's utility from owning
the property may exceed that of the new owner and the new mar-
ket value. Ordinarily market mechanisms would decide whose
utility is higher-on the basis of who was willing to sacrifice the
most income to hold the property. As has been shown, Berger's
proposal for overriding the market is seriously flawed even on rel-
atively conservative theoretical and empirical grounds. Several
196. This assumes that the large department store could qualify as public and
the corner grocery could not. While it is fairly clear that the first assumption is
true, the second is debatable, largely because Berger's concept of public is rather
poorly defined. Perhaps the corner store could also qualify as public. If so, there
would be very few takings that could not be found public. Nonetheless, there
would still be a substantial inequality between the department store and the gro-
cery, since the former would ordinarily have the resources to buy out the latter
but not vice versa. Finally, Berger never notes the possibility raised in this hypo-
thetical of anticompetitive effects. Perhaps this is where the balancing criterion
would operate to include antitrust considerations and to disallow the taking.
Again, it would place the kind of broad policy responsibility on the courts that
they are likely to wish to avoid, and with good reason.
197. See note 178 supra.
198. Supra note 86, at 238.
199. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1978, Table 771.
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broader problems with his assumptions remain to be noted.
First, it may not be tenable to assume that true social utility
is accurately or adequately reflected by willingness to pay and
market value. Willingness to pay is based on ability to pay, which
is, obviously, a function of income distribution. Though a poor
person may get as much satisfaction out of a particular piece of
property as a rich person, and may even produce as much with it,
if ability to pay determines allocation the rich person will get the
property over the poor person. This problem with market alloca-
tion would be exacerbated by giving eminent domain to prospec-
tive buyers. No longer could the less wealthy party ensure contin-
ued enjoyment of property simply by refusing to sell. If the
transfer would raise market value, sale could be compelled. Mar-
ket value, moreover, may be an even poorer indicator of utility
than effective demand. As already noted, it can be manipulated
by large economic organizations, and it is inherently uncertain,
amorphous, and difficult to measure. The rub is that it is also
heavily influenced by ability to pay. Property values in poor
neighborhoods will ordinarily be low, because poor people cannot
afford to pay a great deal for property. Should wealthier people
wish to purchase property there, they could pay more than the
residents, and the "market value" of the properties would be
higher after the property transfer than before. Under the right set
of facts (e.g., a nondiscriminatory, nonexclusionary condominium
assocation whose only practicable avenue of expansion is into the
poorer neighborhood), Berger's scheme might grant the wealthier
group the added advantage of eminent domain. To be sure, the
poorer owners might sell in any event, but under this proposed
scheme they would have even less choice and less bargaining
power in the matter.200
Second, while ostensibly emphasizing the public nature of
benefits provided by many takings, Berger's scheme in effect con-
siders only private (market) forms of benefit. Sax raises a parallel
problem in considering which governmental restraints on prop-
200. A problem afflicting all takings in poorer neighborhoods should also be
noted here. Poorer neighborhoods generally contain a much higher proportion of
renters than wealthier areas. Not only are renters usually not compensated for
inconvenience, however, but the poorer they are the harder it will often be for
them to find affordable replacement housing, particularly in reasonable proximity
to work, services, and so forth.
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erty use should be treated as takings and which ones as regula-
tions.2 ' Noting that courts ordinarily ask "whether, and to what
extent, the owner's ability to profit from the piece of property in
question, considered by itself, has been impaired,"20 2 he proposes
that courts should "recognize diffusely-held claims [primarily
rights to be free of spillover effects from private uses of other
property] as public rights, entitled to equal consideration in legis-
lative or judicial resolution of conflicting claims to the common
resource base."20 Relying in part on the same assumption that
underlies Berger's argument-that market transactions in private
rights often fail to maximize net social utility-Sax comes to what
is in some ways a contrary conclusion. The taking power should
be exercised less, not more. Instead, regulations which in the past
have sometimes been held to be "takings" should be recast as bal-
ances of public and private rights not requiring compensation
where nonspillover uses are economically possible. The decisive
difference between Berger's and Sax's analyses is Berger's willing-
ness to make market value the sole indicator of the social utility
of any use of property. Sax assumes, probably more realistically,
that spillover costs can often exceed the benefits of market-maxi-
mizing uses.2 0 4
Third, Berger may be seriously overestimating the problems
posed by monopoly and hold-out property ownership. To pursue
hold-out behavior,, a property owner must be aware of a buyer's
plan to assemble a number of properties. Buyers of course know
that if sellers are aware of assembly plans they may hold out for
more than they otherwise would and for more than the property
is worth to them. Therefore, rational buyers generally pursue
strategies aimed at avoiding such prices. Two that are well devel-
oped are the use of middlemen and option-to-purchase contracts.
201. Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971).
202. Id. at 151 (emphasis in original).
203. Id. at 159.
204. Spillover effects of course can themselves be seen as takings depending
on the operative definition of property rights. Much of what the courts and legis-
latures did to foster development during the early period of eminent domain in
America was to define certain spillovers of industrialization (consequential dam-
ages generally) not to be takings and to minimize compensation for other costs by
presumptively setting damages. See Horwitz, supra note 49; Michelman, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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Middlemen are regularly employed to conceal the fact that the
same buyer is behind a number of offers. According to Munch's
evidence, they frequently are quite successful.20 5 Options con-
tracts may also be used to hold each seller to a fair proportion of
the available economic rent. Where properties are fairly homoge-
neous, the option contract may even provide that if any other
seller obtains a higher price, the first seller will receive an equaliz-
ing increment.
It may safely be speculated that the vast majority of property
assemblies have been accomplished by these and similar market
means.2" Though it is impossible to estimate on a macro level
whether significant inefficiencies (i.e., losses in productivity) have
been caused by the hold-out or monopoly property-holding Ber-
ger seeks to avoid, evidence for the proposition that eminent do-
main would improve on them is very weak. Eminent domain im-
poses its own distinct costs on property transfers, and effective
means of assembly on the market are available. Therefore, it
seems very unlikely that expanded use of the power will lead to
any net efficiencies in resource use. It might, however, redistrib-
ute benefits from some segments of society to others.
D. Eminent Domain in the Future: The Power to Take
as a Political Commodity
Berger's naively sweeping proposal to expand the availability
of eminent domain is enlightening in part because it manifests
the kinds of biases inherent in any proposal to structure or
restructure property rights.10 7 However, to note that his proposed
scheme probably would not contribute to economic efficiency and
205. F. Munch, supra note 175, at 25-33.
206. Id. See also Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Con-
cept, 42 CAL.IF. L. REV. 596 (1954).
207. See also Dales, Beyond the Marketplace, 1975 CANADIAN J. ECON. 8
(1975) (arguing generally that welfare performance is inherently a function of the
structure of rights); Michelman, supra note 204, at 1204. It should be noted that
this approach implicitly rejects Coase's theorem that the placement of entitle-
ments has no effect on efficiency-or at least finds it irrelevant to this type of
question. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 33 J. LAW AND ECON. 1 (1960). The
problem is not so much that the assumptions of zero transaction costs and perfect
information are violated-although they are-but that the political-juridical sys-
tem can be used to alter entitlements in midstream, thereby effecting substantial
redistributions.
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that its benefits and costs would not be evenly distributed is not
to dispose of the policy problem. Current eminent domain policies
undoubtedly involve social biases and the inevitable new ones will
too. Yet we understand rather little about the actual content of
biases in current policies or the implications of alternative poli-
cies. Which of the alternative standards discussed in the preced-
ing section, for example, would be the more desirable? The ques-
tion breaks down into two problems. The first is to ascertain the
concrete social consequences of each alternative. The second is to
understand that any policy actually adopted will reflect the rela-
tive political effectiveness of parties who stand to benefit and lose
from it.
With regard to the issue of actual consequences, a further
lesson of Berger's proposal is that few of the answers can be de-
rived from abstract hypothesizing. Stronger conclusions may be
possible in other fields, like torts, where the discussants have a
richer personal understanding of the consequences of alternative
policies. 0 8 With respect to eminent domain, an extensive, rather
elaborately argued scheme like Berger's can be largely dismantled
with one, relatively modest empirical study.2 " While that study
does indicate regressive income effects for an existing eminent do-
main policy however, it tells us little about the broader purposes
and possible effects of the policy.
Conceptually, it seems clear that the increasing use of emi-
nent domain detailed in the previous section is inconsistent with
stable, relatively inviolable property rights. Several decades ago,
Schumpeter mused generally about a continuing "evaporation" of
property rights.'" Where might they be evaporating to? Focusing
historically on the question, Horwitz finds eminent domain the
most potent instrument used in redistributing power from what
he terms the "old" to the "new" property during the antebellum
period.' The old property was located in the property holders of
a settled, largely agrarian economy, the new property in the capi-
talists of an emerging, largely industrial economy. The spillovers
from the new property and the need to concentrate increasing
208. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
209. F. Munch, supra note 175.
210. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 141 (1942).
211. Horwitz, supra note 49.
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quantities of resources in single industrial uses were inconsistent
with the agrarian principle of undisturbed enjoyment of prop-
erty."2 The expanded use of eminent domain, the elimination of
many previously available remedies for property damage, and the
diminished compensation provisions which accompanied them, all
inured to the benefit of the new property over the old. The pro-
cess may be portrayed as one of subsidization in which the cur-
rency was legal rights. By slowly eroding the legal rights of the
old property and augmenting those of the new property, the legis-
latures and courts lowered the costs of economic development for
the emerging bourgeoise and imposed many of these costs on the
old agrarian order .2 1
Can the process be seen to have continued in the postbellum
period? Yes, although its thrust probably has changed somewhat.
In an effort to analyze the massive growth-the so-called quiet
revolution-in land use planning during the past half-century,
Geisler argues that the process is a result, not of the emergence of
a new land ethic, but of the continuing development of American
capitalism."' From the increasingly large-scale, but still competi-
tive capitalism of the late eighteenth century has emerged a "dual
economy" composed of a competitive but subordinate sector and
a superordinate, essentially noncompetitive "monopoly" sector. 15
212. At least one court was very explicit about this problem:
[Tihe general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and
possession of my real estate, and that I must so use my real estate as to not
injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social state.
We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They are
demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our
civilization.
Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873).
213. Horwitz concludes that "by the time of the Civil War American courts
had created a variety of legal doctrines whose primary effect was to force those
injured by economic activities to bear the cost of those improvements." Horwitz,
supra note 49, at 278. It should be noted that Horwitz's analysis is also subject to
the methodological problems noted above regarding Berger. It is difficult to infer
social effects from legal policies. Horwitz, however, has taken the trouble to spec-
ify a theoretical framework and to place the legal decisions in their historical
context.
214. Geisler, A Sociological Interpretation of Land Use Planning in a Capital-
ist Society (1979) (unpublished dissertation, Department of Rural Sociology, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Madison).
215. For expositions of the dual economy thesis, see J. O'CONNOR, THE FIscAL
CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973); E. MANDEL, LATE CAPITALIsM (rev. ed. 1975).
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While the dual economy theory is too involved either to present
fully or to critique here, Geisler's essential thesis is that the quiet
revolution is government's response to the expansive needs for
planning and resource coordination of the monopoly sector. It is
"control on the cheap," since control is effectuated without own-
ership. The process of control outstripping ownership, which ini-
tially occurred internal to business organizations, is now being re-
produced externally with the assistance of the state.
Geisler argues that the quiet revolution subsidizes the mo-
nopoly sector in three general ways. First, by limiting current uses
it subsidizes future production and prevents disruptive resource
exhaustion. Second, it socializes mounting environmental over-
head costs. In order to prevent total social costs from growing too
high, certain resource owners are kept from maximizing the prof-
itability of their resources while others already doing so are al-
lowed to continue. Third, the quiet revolution effects a new distri-
bution of wealth tied to control over property rather than to its
exclusive ownership. In legal terms, others are given rights to con-
trol property without any transfer of possession or ownership.
Owners are thus deprived of some of their "property," control
and use prerogatives, without being paid for it.216
A proposal like Berger's provides a striking complement to
the process Geisler portrays. Hooked in tandem to the expanded
land use control system, the expanded eminent domain scheme
would help assure orderly resource availability at very predictable
prices. Limiting compensation to a function of externally deter-
mined market value would prevent resource owners from holding
out for high prices. At the same time, because they would be sub-
ject to takings of any property not developed to its highest mar-
ket value, owners would be under continuous pressures to sell or
develop. But that development would have to occur within land
use control schemes already in place. As control of resources has
become increasingly centralized in government and monopoly sec-
tor corporations, their respective planning apparatuses have be-
come more comprehensive and more integrated. They increas-
216. There are of course alternative interpretations, like Sax's argument that
such correlative rights have always existed and that the quiet revolution has only
been necessary because of the intensified spillover problems coming with increas-
ing industrialization and resource scarcity, which cannot be ruled out on existing
evidence.
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ingly collaborate in determining the broad policies under which
resources will be developed. Those policies in turn are responded
to by regional and local planning agencies, which increasingly
identify their interests with those of major capital-controlling cor-
porations and federal agencies.
The role of eminent domain in the broad scheme just postu-
lated, though narrow, could be quite consequential. Providing em-
inent domain in all hold-out situations would eliminate many sig-
nificant cost uncertainties and force property transfers at
externally determined prices. The prospect of compulsory trans-
fer would prompt owners to continually seek to sell under
favorable market conditions. And it seems likely that predictable
prices and the possibility of compelling sale will grow in impor-
tance as land-based resources become more scarce and monopoly
rents more possible.
Even in a less grandiose form, eminent domain will probably
become increasingly important to continued economic expansion
(which is generally believed necessary to the survival of the econ-
omy). The contemporary economy is heavily built up with plant
and capital of all kinds. Possibilities for internal geographic ex-
pansion are declining rapidly and there is strong international
competition for every external market. Therefore, in order to
maintain returns on investment and facilitate capital expansion,
it is becoming increasingly important to replace still viable but
outmoded economic components with new, usually more capital-
intensive ones. Courtesy Sandwich, where eminent domain was
used to excise a thriving business district and replace it with the
World Trade Center, may be the prototype of the most important
type of taking in the current era.117 Not only does the sheer scale
of today's projects make market assembly difficult, but major eco-
nomic forces with opposing interests, like the real estate groups in
Courtesy Sandwich, will often commit significant economic and
political resources to stopping them. Such a problem seems to be
facing a new mode of coal transport, slurry pipelines. Railroads,
217. See Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d
379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963). Cour-
tesy Sandwich also suggests, of course, that to some extent the goals Berger would
generalize are already being implemented through eminent domain. The only dif-
ference is that project sponsors still have to persuade a governmental authority of
the project's merits.
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which would lose business and profits to the pipelines, are refus-
ing to sell rights-of-way to slurry developers. The pipeline devel-
opers are accordingly seeking both state and federal eminent do-
main powers, and may soon become the first major private
interest directly to receive federal eminent domain.2 18
The very fact that eminent domain remains a government-
granted prerogative is critical, however. To be effectuated any
proposal for a policy change in the use of a governmental power
must make its way through the apparatus of the polity. As has
been noted, different policies will have differentially biased social
consequences, and it will be in the interests of affected constitu-
ents to support or oppose policies depending on their particular
prospects. At present-in part due to an emphasis on studies like
Berger's which, while ostensibly neutral and efficiency-oriented,
in fact obscure major differential impacts-we have only the most
general idea of the concrete consequences of different condemna-
tion policies. It does seem clear that a scheme like Berger's would
contribute to an increasingly fluid set of property relationships
and increasingly centralized resource control. It would in fact ac-
complish a major transfer of entitlements to development and ex-
pansion-oriented interests. Current owners would lose the right to
keep land as it is, and prospective buyers would gain the right to
develop it. The alternative proposal for a stricter public benefit
test, on the other hand, would probably inhibit that transfer pro-
cess somewhat. It would also allow more variety in the structure
of land use and probably would facilitate greater continuity.
Nonetheless, as noted above, its ability to influence substantive
outcomes is subject to the general limitations of the judicial
function.
The actual determination of future policy will doubtless re-
flect the relative political powers and efforts of the groups stand-
ing to benefit or lose. A general proposal to expand eminent do-
main, for instance, seems unlikely to be implemented any time
soon because it would face stiff opposition from many property
holders seeing their rights and security in property threatened.
218. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, COAL SLURRY PIPELINES: PROGRESS AND
PROBLEMS FOR NEW ONES (April 20, 1979). Coal slurries transport pulverized coal,
suspended in water, through underground pipelines. One of the obvious ironies
here is that many of the railroads involved originally obtained their rights-of-way
through eminent domain.
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On the other hand, more moderate extensions toward the same
end through intermittent authorization of condemnations may
well be accomplished without significant opposition-largely be-
cause of our present failure to ascertain their cumulative
consequences.
To some degree, the lack of a broad political understanding
of eminent domain reflects the fact that it is an amorphous, elu-
sive phenomenon. Takings occur sporadically and for all sorts of
purposes. Both policy alternatives discussed above focused pri-
marily on how easy it should be to use eminent domain, not on
what it should be used for. The latter has clearly evolved as a
political question, and no general answers to it would be meaning-
ful at this juncture.219 Yet the question of how easy it should be
to exercise eminent domain, because it in practice entails shifts in
property entitlements, may be more fundamental in some ways,
and must also be subject to political consideration. As the critique
of Berger's proposal demonstrates, the question cannot be ana-
lyzed purely in philosophical or logical terms. To attempt to do so
is to obscure the critical issue of differential social effects. The
consequences of alternative policies are not "neutral" and the as-
sumptions used in supposedly neutral "efficiency" analysis largely
predispose its outcome.2s0
To contribute meaningfully to policymaking in the area, ana-
219. As has been suggested, while ostensibly ruling on whether the use of em-
inent domain was "public" the courts appear occasionally to have been ruling on
the political-philosophical legitimacy of the taking in question. Just how political
the question is may be indicated by the fact that while the courts generally are
willing to allow takings to provide roads for individual landlocked owners, they
never would have allowed them for land redistribution from wealthy to poor, even
though such takings could be justified on similar grounds as the urban redevelop-
ment takings. That kind of purpose, use-by-the-public or not, would simply be too
threatening to the established economic order.
By comparison, it might be noted that several Latin American countries
which also espouse public purpose requirements have in the past amended their
constitutions to allow for the "social reform" of land redistribution. A.
LOWENFELD, EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 314
(1971) (Chile, Peru, and Venezuela). It should also be noted that the more subtle
changes in entitlements discussed above accomplish redistribution similar in
kind-though usually in the opposite direction-and perhaps even similar in
degree.
220. See generally, Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, 1 J.
PosT KEYNESIAN EcON. 100 (1978); Schmid, Nonmarket Values and Efficiency of
Public Investments in Water Resources, 83 AMER. EcON. REV. 57 (1967).
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lysts will have to delve much farther into the terrain of concrete
consequences. Because eminent domain is both such a sporadic
and such an ubiquitous phenomenon, it is peculiarly difficult to
study empirically. No single set of takings, for instance, can be
"sampled" to somehow derive the effects of alternative policies.
Consequences will only become manifest over relatively long time
periods and across numerous instances. The inquiry therefore de-
mands an unusual synthesis and its hypotheses will be more am-
biguous than those in some other areas. Yet, because the ques-
tions involved reach fundamentally to the relationship between
the structure of property rights and the nature of the social order
they support, they are worth pursuing. Given the more substan-
tial understanding which should result, impacted parties might
actually be able to pursue their interests in the matter with the
political vigor they deserve.
